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Introduction
Klaus Lange
The publication at hand contains selected
papers presented at an international confer-
ence organized by the Academy of Politics
and Current Affairs of the Hanns Seidel
Foundation which took place in Wildbad
Kreuth on 16-18 June 2009.
The subject of the conference was "Security
in South Asia: Conventional and Unconven-
tional Factors of Destabilization".
The significance of South Asia in terms of
security aspects is usually underrated in
Europe, particularly when that geographical
area is viewed in a global context. It is also
often overlooked that South Asia holds a
dominant position among the growth regions
of the world. Moreover, South Asia com-
mands an incomparable historical and cul-
tural "sounding board" with the potential to
resonate far beyond regional boundaries.
With the Indian subcontinent as its centre,
South Asia is at the same time saddled with
manifold risks to its stability, risks which
cover a broad spectrum ranging from ex-
treme social polarization and religious an-
tagonisms, through to numerous forms of
terrorism. When the situation is subjected to
closer scrutiny, the impression arises that the
governments of the region are often so
overtaxed when it comes to containing the
current risks to their security and stability
that any prognosis of the future development
of South Asia must be accompanied by nu-
merous question marks. Moreover, it has to
be taken into account that South Asia con-
stitutes a system of interdependence and so
there is little justification for compartmen-
talized research which focuses on individual
states in isolation from each other.
Today South Asia is one of the key regions
where the question of global development as
a whole will be decided. This issue, with all
its accompanying risks and opportunities,
makes it imperative as well as appropriate to
direct a searchlight on the regional security
of South Asia.
The contents of this publication do not claim
to provide comprehensive coverage of all the
risks to stability in South Asia. The topics
here discussed do, however, constitute the-
matic poles around which any future system-
atic analysis would have to be structured: it
can hardly be disputed that India and its
problems of stability would have to be con-
sidered an essential and central subject, as
would the entire interconnected complex of
the Pakistan-Afghan problem.
At the same time it would also make sense
to take another look at the phenomenon of
global terrorism, this time from the vantage
point of recent developments since 9/11.
Finally, any attempt to calculate or predict
the future prospects for stability in South
Asia must in the long term take into account
the Chinese factor.
This publication will have more than ful-
filled its purpose if it results in drawing more
attention to a region, the importance of
which is in inverse proportion to the notice
it currently receives.
Indien – Perspektiven und Risiken
seiner Stabilität und Sicherheit
Hans-Georg Wieck
1. Die Fragestellung
Indien fällt bei der Bewältigung oder Ein-
dämmung der internationalen Bedrohungen
ein erhebliches Maß an Verantwortung und
Gewicht zu, auch wenn das Land in vielen
Fällen nicht in erster Linie oder ausschließ-
lich betroffen ist.
Die Verantwortung für die Bewältigung der
inneren Bedrohungen liegt bei den Akteu-
ren der demokratischen Kräfte und der
staatlichen Institutionen im Lande selbst.
Die innere und äußere Sicherheit und die
politische Stabilität Indiens angesichts un-
übersehbarer, zum Teil existenzieller Risi-
ken hängen meines Erachtens daher vor
allem von folgenden Punkten ab:
– von der Glaubwürdigkeit und Zukunfts-
fähigkeit der indischen Demokratie,
– von der Handlungsfähigkeit ihrer staat-
lichen Institutionen und
– von der Antwort auf die Frage, in wel-
cher geostrategischen Konstellation das
Land seine äußere Sicherheit sucht und
findet.
2. Die Antworten
Die Wahlen vom Mai 2009 – Renaissance
von Demokratie und Handlungsfähigkeit?
1. Die Ergebnisse der indischen Parla-
mentswahlen vom 16. Mai 2009 sind im
Lande und weltweit mit Erleichterung auf-
genommen worden und haben die Erwar-
tung stabiler Mehrheitsverhältnisse für die
fünfjährige Regierungsperiode aufkommen
lassen – nicht ohne gute Gründe.
Die Kongress-Partei verfügt nun über
206 Sitze und stellt in der von ihr ange-
führten United Progressive Alliance mit
262 Sitzen die größte Partei. Andere Parla-
mentsgruppen haben sich der Regierungs-
koalition angeschlossen. Diese verfügt nun
insgesamt über 330 Sitze im indischen Par-
lament (Lok Sabha).
Die Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, national-
hinduistische Partei) eroberte bei den Wah-
len 116 Sitze. Insgesamt verfügt die von
der BJP angeführte National Democratic
Alliance über 159 Sitze.
Überraschend schlecht hat das linke Wahl-
bündnis Third Front mit insgesamt nur
79 Sitzen im indischen Parlament abge-
schnitten.
2. Der überzeugende Sieg der Kongress-
Koalition (United Progressive Alliance), zu
dem gewiss auch die massiven Hilfspro-
gramme für die ländliche Bevölkerung bei-
getragen haben, hat denjenigen politischen
Kräften im Lande Auftrieb gegeben, die
von der Notwendigkeit überzeugt sind, den
Staat nicht nur nach den Regeln der Verfas-
sung als säkularen Staat zu führen und zu
gestalten, sondern auch pro-aktiv den poli-
tisch organisierten Kräften zu begegnen, die
staatliche Institutionen zu Brutstätten religiö-
ser Eiferer und Intoleranz, vor allem hindu-
istischer Natur, werden lassen wollen oder
die den Staat im Wege eines militanten
islamischen Fundamentalismus untergraben
wollen.
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Diese Gefahren bestehen und können nur
im Wege politischen Dialogs, politischer
Vision und in Konfliktfällen durch die Ur-
teile unabhängiger Gerichte gebannt wer-
den. Die beiden großen Parteien haben auf
diesem Felde in der Vergangenheit gesün-
digt.
3. "Good Governance" hat jetzt wieder eine
Chance. "Good Governance" ist der Schlüs-
sel zur Bewältigung der Glaubwürdigkeits-
krise der indischen Demokratie
Der Wahlsieg der Kongress-Partei wird
von vielen Beobachtern nicht nur als eine
Bestätigung des Ministerpräsidenten Man-
mohan Singh, der ein ausgewiesener und
erfahrener Fachmann für alle finanz- und
wirtschaftspolitischen Fragen ist, angese-
hen. Sonja Gandhi, die Parteivorsitzende
und der "spiritus rector" der Regierungs-
politik, und Manmohan Singh müssen nun
nicht mehr ihre Energie im Ringen mit
den Kommunisten verschleißen, die ja die
Manmohan Singh-Regierung von außen
stützten und somit tolerierten, aber Schlüs-
selentscheidungen ver- und behinderten.
Der Erfolg der Kongress-Partei ist vor allem
auf den Umstand zurückzuführen, dass, ei-
ner Abstimmung in der Familie folgend, mit
Rahul Gandhi der landesweit gehegte My-
thos der positiven Rolle der Nehru-Gandhi-
Familie für das Wohl und Wehe Indiens
erneut Gestalt angenommen hat. Rahul ist
der Hoffnungsträger der Nation, vor allem
der Jugend.
In Uttar Pradesch gelang es ihm, einen
eindrucksvollen Wahlsieg einzufahren. Er
führte demokratische Wahlen in der Ju-
gendorganisation dieses Bundesstaates ein.
Rahul Gandhi ist einer der zwölf General-
sekretäre der Kongress-Partei und hat die
Jugendarbeit übernommen. Die Verjüngung
der Parteikader ist im Gange und lässt
Hoffnung aufkommen, nicht nur in der
Partei, sondern auch im Lande.
Rahul Gandhi hat die Jugend des Landes
aufgerufen, sich für dieses Land zu engagie-
ren (Kennedy-Komplex). Dieser Appell ist
glaubwürdig. Er wurde in Uttar Pradesch
sehr kräftig von seiner Charisma ausstrah-
lenden Schwester Priyanka Gandhi Vadra
unterstützt. Die Verjüngung der Führungs-
kräfte ist angesichts der gegenwärtig die
Macht verwaltenden Altenriege unerläss-
lich, die sowohl in der Regierung als auch
in der Opposition immer noch dominant ist.
Für diese Verjüngung steht Rahul Gandhi –
und mit ihm auch die Sehnsucht nach Visi-
onen für die Zukunft, wie es bei seinem
Vater Rajiv der Fall gewesen war.
Rahul Gandhi selbst weiß um den Vorwurf
der Korruption, der auf der Kongress-Partei
und seinem Vater lastet, und um den Mangel
an partei-interner Demokratie. Analog zu
sozialdemokratischen Vorstellungen setzt
er sich für ein sozial abgesichertes Wirt-
schaftswachstum ("inclusive economic
growth") ein.
4. Kongress-Partei und BJP haben im letz-
ten Jahrzehnt die Kraft und Anziehungskraft
verloren, aufstrebende, auf Mitgestaltung
drängende politische Gruppierungen, vor
allem aus den sozial schwachen Teilen der
Bevölkerung, an sich zu binden. Diese auf-
strebenden Kräfte der Dalits und Adivasis
erobern seit Jahren mit eigenen Parteigrün-
dungen politische Positionen in den Bun-
desländern und sind als Koalitionspartner
der beiden großen Parteistrukturen schwie-
rige Partner.
Kongress-Partei und BJP konnten in Jahre
2004 und 2009 nur 48,97% bzw. 48,67%
der Stimmen im ganzen Land auf sich ver-
einen – also jeweils nur fast die Hälfte,
aber eben nicht mehr. Das reicht nicht für
landesweit auftretende nationale Parteien.
5. Zu erinnern ist auch daran, dass der Füh-
rer der BJP, L.K. Advani, der im Dezember
1992 als führender BJP-Politiker die Ver-
antwortung für den Sturm auf die Moschee
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in Ayodhya trug, in den Augen großer Teile
der Öffentlichkeit für das Konzept eines
entsäkularisierten Staates steht. Das ist eine
lebensgefährliche Perspektive für den multi-
ethischen und multi-religiösen Staat Indien.
Als Nachfolger im Vorsitz der BJP wird der
Ministerpräsident von Gujerat, Narendra
Modi, gehandelt, der Mann, dem die Ver-
antwortung für die hinduistischen Rache-
akte an der muslimischen Bevölkerung nach
einem Muslim-Angriff gegen einen Eisen-
bahnzug mit hinduistischen Pilgern im Jah-
re 2002 zur Last gelegt wird.
Der säkulare Staat sieht sich demnach wei-
terhin einer großen Herausforderung durch
das von erheblichen Bevölkerungsteilen
unterstützte Hindutwa Konzept für Indien
ausgesetzt. Der Staat muss in allen
"kommunalen" Fragen Toleranz, Dialog
und Gewaltlosigkeit sowie die Unpartei-
lichkeit der staatlichen Organe und der
Gerichte durchsetzen – in den Dörfern, in
denen Brahmanen und Grundbesitzer über
Dalits und Adivasis herrschen, ebenso wie
bei der Quotenregelung, um die soziale
Integration der traditionell ausgegrenzten
Bürger (250 Millionen Menschen) zu er-
reichen.
6. Das Wahlergebnis vom 16. Mai 2009 ist
eine Chance, gibt Hoffnung auf einen Neu-
anfang, um die gegenwärtig stattfindende
schrittweise Aushöhlung der staatsbürgerli-
chen Dimension der Verfassungsordnung
und der politischen Kultur des Landes zu
bremsen und zu korrigieren.
"Gewalt und Gewaltfreiheit in Südasien",
hat vor kurzem anlässlich seiner Berufung
der junge Indologe Werner Wessler an der
Universität Bonn zum Thema seiner An-
trittsvorlesung gemacht. In der Begründung
für die Wahl des Themas führt er aus:
"Frieden und Stabilität der einzelnen Staa-
ten wie auch der Region Südasien als gan-
zer entscheiden sich an der Frage, ob es
gelingt, die tief eingewurzelten multi- und
interkulturellen Erfahrungen der Menschen
in einen kritisch-reflexiven Modernitätsdis-
kurs einzubinden. Dies hatte schon Mahat-
ma Gandhi (1869-1948) mit seiner Pro-
grammschrift 'Hind Swaraj' angestrebt, die
vor hundert Jahren (1909) erschien. Gan-
dhis Klassiker des Antikolonialismus und
der gewaltfreien Aktion entstand keines-
wegs auf einer Insel der Seligen, sondern in
der komplizierten tagespolitischen Gemen-
gelage und vor dem Hintergrund einer Ge-
schichte Südasiens, deren Blutspur nicht
weniger überwältigend ist als die von ande-
ren Weltregionen."
Die Dimension dieser Aufgabe ist unvor-
stellbar groß.
7. Angesichts des hohen Ansehens der
als Verfassungsorgan verankerten Wahl-
kommission wird auch in diesem Jahr mit
guten Gründen von einer im Ganzen fairen
und freien Wahl in Indien gesprochen. Aber
der Vorwurf und die Vermutung von fi-
nanzieller Korruption wird immer wieder
erhoben und in Einzelfällen nachgewiesen.
Nach den Erhebungen von Transparency
International nimmt Indien den Rang 85 in
der Rangfolge der 185 Staaten und Gesell-
schaften ein, die untersucht werden – also
eine Position in der Mitte der Gesamtliste.
China steht etwas besser da – auf Position 72.
In den Analysen des Bertelsmann Transfor-
mation Index 2008 nimmt Indien im Status-
Index (Mittelwert bei Politischer Transfor-
mation und Wirtschaftlicher Transformation)
die Position 24 (von 119 Ländern) und
beim Management Index (Bewertung der
Managementleistung der politischen Ent-
scheidungsträger) die Position 32 ein.
Das sind beachtliche Positionen für einen
Staat von der Größe und der Komplexität
Indiens. China kann in keinem dieser Indi-
ces glänzen.
Der "Freedom House Index 2008" ordnet
Indien unter den freien Ländern ein. Das
hat der Freedom House Index nicht immer
getan!
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8. Auf das Engste mit dem Erfordernis der
Glaubwürdigkeit und Stabilität der Demo-
kratie sowie der Handlungsfähigkeit der
staatlichen Institutionen ist die Ernsthaftig-
keit und Effizienz der staatlichen Politik zur
Überwindung der strukturellen Armut (25%
der Bevölkerung) und des Analphabe-
tentums (mehr als 40% der Bevölkerung)
verbunden. Dabei ist nicht nur die soziale
und menschenrechtliche Dimension von
Bedeutung, sondern auch die Lebensfähig-
keit der Megastädte in Indien selbst, die Ge-
fahr laufen, von den ständig wachsenden
Slums in eine existenzielle Krise gerissen
zu werden, da sie den Nährboden für Epi-
demien und Pandemien und vielleicht auch
einmal für gewaltsame soziale Unruhen
darstellen.
Die geostrategische Einbettung Indiens
Die regionale Sicherheitslage Indiens ist
heute von der inneren Schwäche, ja Labili-
tät seiner Nachbarn im SAARC-Rahmen
geprägt. Der indische Politikwissenschaftler
Amitabh Mattoo charakterisierte die Lage
mit den Worten, dass Indien in der Nach-
barschaft gescheiterter Staaten lebe – mit
anderen Worten: Indien gleicht einer Insel
in einem Meer von Gewalt:
– Auf Sri Lanka wurde jetzt erst ein
25 Jahre währender Bürgerkrieg mit
fast 100.000 Opfern beendet.
– In Birma herrscht die älteste Militär-
diktatur der Welt.
– Nepal ist gekennzeichnet von Bürger-
krieg und Systemwechsel mit der Per-
spektive weiterer Unruhen.
– Pakistan, Bangladesch und Afghanistan
sind von der Gefahr einer islamischen
Revolution bzw. Talibanisierung be-
droht, die auch Teile der islamischen
Bevölkerung in Indien erfassen könnte.
Im afghanisch-pakistanischen Grenz-
gebiet arbeiten US- und Pakistan-
Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen Talibane
und Al Qaida-Zellen zusammen. Indien
stellt das tatsächliche Engagement Pa-
kistans in diesen existenziellen Fragen
in Frage. Indien hat sein finanzielles
und politisches Engagement in Afgha-
nistan verstärkt. Die Lage in Pakistan/
Afghanistan ist kritisch, nicht zuletzt
wegen der Gefahr, dass pakistanische
Nuklearwaffen in die Hände und unter
die Kontrolle der Talibane kommen
könnten.
Das gesamte Umfeld Indiens, also der ge-
samte benachbarte SAARC-Raum, ist von
internen Unsicherheiten und Instabilitäten
gekennzeichnet. Das muss Indien zu ver-
stärkten Anstrengungen veranlassen, im bi-
lateralen Prozess zur inneren Stabilität die-
ser Länder beizutragen – eine der Quadratur
des Kreises gleichende Aufgabe.
In dieser von Unsicherheiten und Gefahren
bestimmten Lage bemüht sich Indien aus
guten Gründen um einen "Modus vivendi"
mit China, dem größten Handelspartner
Indiens. Gleiches versuchte vor mehr als
50 Jahren in einer idealistischen Vision
auch Jawaharlal Nehru. Er scheiterte damals,
wie er nach der chinesischen Invasion im
Nordosten Indiens im Jahre 1962 bekennen
musste.
Bestehen heute bessere Aussichten auf Er-
folg? Das lässt sich nicht mit Bestimmtheit
sagen. Aber der Versuch muss auf jeden
Fall unternommen werden.
Indien ist aber auch bereit und interessiert,
über die schon mit den USA auf dem Ge-
biet der friedlichen Nutzung der Nuklear-
technologie und der rüstungspolitischen Zu-
sammenarbeit getroffenen Vereinbarungen
mit den USA hinaus eine internationale
Funktion bei der Sicherung des Seeverkehrs
im Indischen Ozean und der angrenzenden
Seewege (Golf von Aden, Straße von Ma-
lakka) zu übernehmen und entsprechende
Vereinbarungen mit den USA zu treffen.
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Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA soll
auch der Sicherung indischer Interessen
bei US-Engagements in den benachbarten
Staaten, vor allem im Raum Afghanistan/
Pakistan, dienen. Den USA werden wohl
auf der Basis der Gegenseitigkeit gewisse
Stationierungsrechte in indischen Häfen
eingeräumt werden. Der Vertrag liegt be-
reits seit zwei Jahren unterschriftsreif vor.
Die Seeüberwachung wird eine gemeinsa-
me Aufgabe werden. Die Seewege durch
den Indischen Ozen und die angrenzenden
Seegebiete, über die zwei Drittel der welt-
weit stattfindenden Öltransporte und ein
Drittel des globalen Containerverkehrs
gehen, werden derzeit vor allem durch Pi-
raterie gefährdet, könnten aber in genuin
internationalen Spannungen auch anderen
Bedrohungen ausgesetzt werden. Auch sucht
Indien wie die USA eine generelle Über-
wachungskapazität aufzubauen – nicht zu-
letzt wegen der aufkommenden chinesischen
Marinepräsenz im Indischen Ozean.
Gleichzeitig will Indien Vereinbarungen mit
den Anrainerstaaten des Indischen Ozeans
einbeziehen.
Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA ist in
Indien nicht unumstritten. Angesichts der
instabilen politischen und sicherheitspoliti-
schen Lage in der Region muss Indien aber
eine stabile, auch strategisch relevante Zu-
sammenarbeit mit dem benachbarten China
und mit den USA – allerdings mit unter-
schiedlichen Schwerpunkten – suchen.
Vor diesem regionalen Hintergrund der Si-
cherheitsklage Indiens verbietet sich aller-
dings eine geostrategische, implizit gegen
China gerichtete strategische Zusammen-
arbeit mit den USA, also eine gegen China
gerichtete Allianz mit den USA.
Eine andere, vor allem von Moskau und zum
Teil von Beijing geförderte geostrategische
Vorstellung, nämlich engste Zusammenar-
beit zwischen Indien, China und der Russi-
schen Föderation anzustreben – und zwar
implizit mit einer anti-amerikanischen Per-
spektive – dürfte heute in Indien kaum auf
Gegenliebe stoßen. Allerdings gibt es durch-
aus dahin gehende Vorstellungen einiger
indischer Politiker und Sachverständiger.
Indien nimmt jedoch wie andere Staaten in
Asien auch als Beobachter an der Schang-
hai-Gruppe teil.
3. Schlussfolgerungen
Sicherheit und Stabilität Indiens sind also
im Lande wie auf der internationalen Bühne
erheblichen Gefahren und Risiken ausge-
setzt: zum einen durch den hinduistischen
und den islamischen Fundamentalismus im
Lande selbst und zum anderen durch den
inneren Zerfall der benachbarten Staaten
mit der Folge möglicher grenzüberschrei-
tender gewaltsamer Konflikte mit internati-
onalen Auswirkungen.
Im Inneren braucht Indien eine Renaissance
des säkularen und demokratisch verfassten
integrativen Staates und eine sozial veran-
kerte Wirtschaftsentwicklung.
Auf der internationalen Bühne braucht In-
dien eine stabile Beziehung mit China und
mit den USA – mit jeweils unterschiedli-
chen Schwerpunkten, jedoch ohne gegen
den einen oder den anderen Partner ge-
richtete Allianzen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund muss Indien selbst
auf bilateralem Wege zur Stabilität in den
benachbarten SAARC-Staaten pro-aktiv
beitragen.
Terrorism: difficulties faced by national governments
and the international community in countering the threat
Michael Chandler
1. Introduction
Tragically, some of the issues raised in this
paper have been made on a number of pre-
vious occasions. I have talked about these
difficulties in presentations and in my book
"Countering terrorism: can we meet the
threat of global violence?" The points are
reflected in the reports submitted to the UN
Security Council by the Monitoring Group
which I had the privilege to chair from 2001
to 2004.
The word "tragically" is used quite inten-
tionally because time and again we see a
distinct lack of progress in both national and
international efforts to counter the threat.
Some of the difficulties will be touched upon
and the paper will also explore other reasons
for this lack of progress: they are usually
perceptions – often ill-founded ones – due to
an inability to know and understand that
most fundamental aspect of dealing with
terrorism, namely the threat.
This paper deals primarily with countries in
South Asia: those with a direct interest in
the region and others which have influence
with the regional actors. The paper also
concentrates on the importance of this area,
with respect to the most overt international
terrorist threat, a fact highlighted in the la-
test report to the UN Security Council of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitor-
ing Team: "…When the Team last reported,
in March 2008, the critical importance of
the border area between Afghanistan and
Pakistan in terms of the threat from the
Taliban, Al-Qaida and other associated
groups … was already apparent. Since then
it has become even more so. Although there
are threats elsewhere, there is no other area
of the world where the success of counter-
terrorism measures will mean more, and
their failure have greater consequences,
than in South Asia …"1
2. Pakistan and South Asian security
The geopolitical location of Pakistan is piv-
otal to the broader security situation in the
South Asia region. Currently it is experi-
encing its own insurgency from the Pakistan
Taliban. At the same time the Taliban are
conducting an insurgency inside Afghanis-
tan, using the areas of Pakistan as a safe ha-
ven and a springboard for these operations.
The long-running sore of the disputed re-
gion in Kashmir or Jammu and Kashmir
also remains unresolved after many dec-
ades, providing grounds for tension between
Pakistan and India. Attacks inside India by
militants and extremists are a regular occur-
rence. Despite India having a plethora of
domestic terrorist or insurgent groups,2
whenever there is a major terrorist attack,
such as the attacks on the Bombay/Mumbai
hotels, railway station and Jewish Centre,
Pakistan is immediately accused even be-
fore the dust has settled. As it happens, in
this case there was a connection and the
event was enough for tensions between the
two countries to be raised yet again. How-
ever, in many other cases it is other dispa-
rate groups, often non-Muslim ones that
prove in the end to be responsible for ter-
rorist atrocities in India.
The proximity of the Middle East and Iran
are also key to the security situation. Many
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of the "foreign fighters" associated with
Al-Qaida who went to Iraq to wage jihad
against the US and its coalition allies have
moved into the Pakistan border regions and
joined the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan –
their so-called cause in Iraq having lost im-
petus. Also, their presence in Iraq has be-
come no longer acceptable to the majority
of Iraqis, even many of the Sunni alongside
of whom they were fighting.
In addition, the seat of Islam and the Ara-
bian peninsula are, by modern standards of
travel and influence, but a stone's throw
away. Saudi Arabia had played a significant
supporting role, through Pakistan, to the
mujahideen in their ousting of the Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, and along with
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates
maintained close ties with the Taliban
movement in Afghanistan in its attempts to
"Islamize" the country between 1994 and
2001. On the sidelines is a resurgent Russia
and a rapidly developing China, presenting
a new flavour to the former Great Game
that was played out in the late 19th century
by the major powers of the day.
But just how pivotal is the situation in Pakis-
tan was emphasized by the Analytical Sup-
port and Sanctions Monitoring Team of
the UN Security Council in their Report of
13 May 2009, in which the team went on to
state that: "While they have not developed
unified plans or objectives, the Taliban
groups in Pakistan continue to test the limits
of their power. The outcome of their
struggle with the authorities in Pakistan,
which has now extended well beyond the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, is
crucial to the future of Al-Qaida, whose
presence in the border area relies on their
support. The Team has not been able to
verify reports of the Pakistan Taliban plan-
ning attacks outside the country, but if the
link with Al-Qaida becomes stronger, it is
possible that a new energy may infuse the
global threat from terrorism."
Recent events in Pakistan have brought this
statement into even sharper focus. For a
long time Pakistan was obliged for very
good domestic reasons to walk a tightrope
between responding to requests from the
USA to deal much more robustly with the
Taliban and Al-Qaida (who are one and the
same to US domestic audiences) and acqui-
escing to a large Muslim population. Sig-
nificant numbers of Pakistani Muslims have
a greater empathy towards the Taliban, on
account of them being fellow Pashtuns and
Muslims, than towards the 'infidel' USA,
which had seemingly abandoned them and
over 2.5 million Afghan refugees after the
Soviet Army had been ousted from Af-
ghanistan in 1989. Now the tables have
been turned, and quite dramatically at that.
The reality of Islamist extremism is four-
square on Pakistan's front door. There was
the protracted engagement between Pakis-
tan's security forces and Islamist militants at
the Red Mosque; a variety of serious gov-
ernmental and security-related issues in the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP); and
conflict in some of the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in Waziris-
tan which border Afghanistan and in which
the Taliban and Al-Qaida have unimpeded
freedom of movement and sanctuary based
on a life-long established culture of 'hospi-
tality to the traveller'. But the worst of these
issues relates to events in the Swat Valley.
This case is of crucial importance to a
democratic Pakistan, in that the country has
found itself embroiled in a major insur-
gency. Some may argue that it brought it on
itself by not being in a position to recognize
and deal robustly with the threat.
3. Terrorism as a tactic
The key point is that "terrorism" per se is a
tactic utilized by militants and extremists
and not just Islamist militants and extrem-
ists (although they are the primary threat in
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this discussion) in attempting to achieve
their goals. But a careful assessment of how,
why and where militant groups associated
with Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban are car-
rying out terrorist attacks has revealed that a
number of countries are actually experienc-
ing or facing insurgency and the terrorists
then become insurgents, which is a more
accurate description.
By definition, for example according to
Princeton University's lexical database, an
insurgency is "an organized rebellion aimed
at overthrowing a constituted government
through the use of subversion and armed
conflict".3
This is somewhat at odds with the definition
of terrorism, a problem that still exists for a
small number of countries despite realistic
attempts by the United Nations to obtain a
consensus in 2005 with the following defi-
nition: "any action … that is intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civil-
ians or non-combatants, when the purpose
of such an act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population or to compel a Gov-
ernment or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act".
Although most UN member states accept
this definition, a small number of Arab
countries and Iran do not agree with it. The
dissenters have always wanted an amend-
ment that recognizes the activities of Israel
against the Palestinians as "acts of terror-
ism" and naturally there are key players on
the world scene who in turn will not accept
this approach. Why? Because in the first in-
stance it is the Palestinians that resorted to
acts of terrorism, not just directly against Is-
rael, but to make their point they took their
"acts of terrorism" to many other countries,
with aircraft hijackings, attacks on airports,
against diplomats and even the Olympic
Games in Munich 1972. Here again we see
terrorism being used as a tactic to try and
achieve a political end, in this case so far
without success.
However, the most important point in this
discussion is knowing with what you are
dealing. In Iraq, the US-lead coalition soon
realized that the attacks against them were
coming primarily from Iraqis inside Iraq, in
the form of guerilla warfare, and that it was
an insurgency that had to be understood and
tackled as such. Terrorist groups were in-
volved, but then so were significant num-
bers of the indigenous folk.
4. Continuing mistrust between
India and Pakistan, and
Afghanistan and Pakistan
The mistrust between India and Pakistan is
deeply rooted in the problems of Jammu
and Kashmir. Pakistan feels that it went a
long way on this issue while General Pervez
Musharraf was President and that India has
failed to reciprocate. India for her part con-
siders that Pakistan still does not do enough
to reduce the threat to India from Islamist
militants based in Pakistan.
In relation to its current military operation
in the Swat Valley, Pakistan will say that it
is now tackling the Taliban head-on. How-
ever, this has only been possible because
Pakistan is now a democracy and not a
military dictatorship. The country has an
independent judiciary and proudly boasts a
lively and dynamic free press and media:
there are now over 50 independent televi-
sion stations in Pakistan. The Pakistan
Armed Forces are now seen as under demo-
cratic control. A 'cross-party' consensus has
been achieved in the parliament that non-
state actors will not be tolerated within the
country's borders, especially when they
challenge the legitimate authority of the
elected government.
But it is not an easy task. The Pakistan
Armed Forces have to a large extent been
organized for conventional warfare and not
asymmetric warfare. The US also learnt the
16 Michael Chandler
difference at great cost after it invaded Iraq
in 2003 and then found itself fighting on
two fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan. The UK
found the adjustment less of a problem,
perhaps because it had far more experience
over past decades of conducting low-inten-
sity operations around the world. In fact in
the early days of the so-called invasion of
Iraq in March 2003, British units in and
around Basra in south-east Iraq applied the
well-established practices of "hearts and
minds" in an effort to convince the local
population that they, the UK Forces, really
were there to rid the country of tyrannical
rule. Pakistani Army officers have revealed
in conversations that they know the size of
the task. It does not require a military gen-
ius to see what a daunting challenge faces
the Pakistan Armed Forces. Simply the ter-
rain of the Swat Valley presents enormous
difficulties for counter-insurgency operations.
Within the Pakistan army there are officers
who know the importance of reaching out to
the population, who know the importance of
"hearts and minds".
The reason why the Pakistan Armed Forces
have been organized on conventional lines
is that the main threat to the country was
always perceived to be India. This particu-
lar threat was also the explanation for Paki-
stan's sympathy and support for the Taliban.
In addition to being Pashtun, like the ma-
jority of the tribes that occupy Pakistan's
eastern border regions with Afghanistan,
southern Afghanistan was seen as providing
Pakistan with "strategic depth" in the event
of an Indian invasion. Even if a little am-
bivalent, well-informed Pakistanis will tell
you now that India is not a threat. If that is
the case, then it should now be possible to
start reorganizing, re-equipping and re-
training at least a significant proportion of
the Pakistan Armed Forces for asymmetric
operations. The success of such a reorgani-
zation will, however, depend on how far the
threat to the country is appreciated and un-
derstood. That is a fundamental and crucial
aspect of countering terrorism.
5. The importance of
understanding the threat
Having a clear understanding of the threat is
fundamental to being able to effectively
counter it. If the threat is not understood
then it is not possible to develop the appro-
priate strategy and tactics to counter the
threat and decide on the correct resources to
achieve the goals defined by the strategy
that is adopted. Understanding the threat
demands political will and this is an impor-
tant ingredient that is missing time and
again from the counter-terrorism efforts of
the international community.
Despite the outward sympathy that most
countries and states expressed to the USA
in response to the 9/11 attacks in the USA,
it soon became apparent that many coun-
tries had reservations concerning the im-
plementation of measures called for unani-
mously by the UN Security Council under
Chapter VII resolutions. Specifically,
Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001
("Threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts") and all relevant
resolutions, starting with Resolution 1267 in
1999 concerning sanctions against Al-Qaida
and the Taliban, their supporters and sym-
pathizers have presented many governments
with dilemmas. This process has improved
with time, but it continues to be hampered
by interpretation of the Listing versus "due
process". This is invariably a national
problem and even when countries have up-
held sanctions measures against listed indi-
viduals and entities, other august bodies
have upheld the appeal of the individuals –
the different attempts of Yussef al-Qadi
(a.k.a. al-Kadi) are just one such case in
point. This has proved counterproductive in
the international effort to counter terrorism
and has only encouraged weaker govern-
ments not to fully implement the required
sanctions measures.
Another reason for these less than compli-
ant attitudes has been revulsion on the part
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of many people to the so-called "global war
on terror". The use of this phrase, the Global
War on Terror (GWOT), to define the threat
as perceived by the Bush Administration
was unfortunate. Notwithstanding the fact
that Osama bin Laden "declared war"
against the Jews, the 'crusaders' (USA) and
their Allies, the use of this phrase proved
to be counterproductive and repugnant to
many countries which were initially sup-
portive following the 9/11 attacks in the US.
Most prefer to speak about "combating
transnational terrorism", if in fact the term
"terrorism" is to be used at all. The key point
is that terrorism per se is a tactic utilized by
militants, in this case Islamist militants, in
attempting to achieve their goals. It is not
possible to wage war against a tactic.
This brings us back to the question as to
whether the "Global War on Terror" in
South Asia can ever be won. This would
appear to be a non-question. Whatever the
nature of the particular threat with which
we are faced collectively, it has to be dealt
with effectively. But wars are something
that has to be won. This would infer a vic-
tory and a foe who has been vanquished.
And so in this case to call it a war is incor-
rect. What remains the single most impor-
tant fact is that the threat must be appreci-
ated and understood in order for the cam-
paign to be successful. The threat in the
case of the Taliban, whether in Pakistan or
in Afghanistan, and their Al-Qaida associ-
ates, is that they are staging an insurgency.
This is particularly relevant in the case of
Pakistan, because the Taliban are intent on
changing the legal basis of the state in
which they live as well as trying to under-
mine the legitimacy of the government. These
insurgents are using terror as one of their
tactics, both against the villagers whose
hospitality they have demanded and against
what they perceive to be legitimate targets,
whether police stations, politicians, hotels
or mosques.
6. Conclusion
It is fundamental for national governments
and the international community to under-
stand the threat if the right strategy, tactics
and resources are to be deployed, even
when this carries cost implications and
means that the local armed forces may have
to be retrained.
"Hearts and minds" are an important part of
an effective counter-insurgency campaign.
It is crucial to harness the will of the popu-
lation against the insurgents or, sometimes,
to persuade the insurgents of the futility of
their perceived cause, ideology or even
plain simple criminal behaviour. It is often
the case that terrorist acts are murder and
mayhem, nothing more than crimes com-
mitted against people and property.
The final significant pillar of countering in-
surgency is intelligence – sound, accurate,
timely intelligence to enable the "forces of
good" to triumph over the "forces of evil".
This is also another reason why developing
the "hearts and minds" aspect of the cam-
paign is so important, because when the ci-
vilian population is supportive of the secu-
rity forces then it is much more inclined to
provide information which in turn becomes
essential intelligence.
Notes
1 See paragraph 4 of UN Security Council docu-
ment S/2009/245 dated 13 May 2009. The Team's
report of March 2008 is document S/2008/324.
2 See www.satp.org – India terrorist groups.
3 See http://wordnet.princeton.edu.
Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics
Vinod Anand
Left-wing extremism (LWE) is one of the
three ideological streams in India which have
employed terror tactics in varying degrees,
the other two being Islamism and ethnicity-
based movements in India. Also known as
Maoism or Naxalism, LWE is based on
the belief that terrorism is the only viable
strategy for revolutionary movements on
behalf of the weak in the Third World,
among others in countries such as Malaysia
or Vietnam. It had surfaced in Europe and
elsewhere, especially since the late 1950s.
The Red Army Faction in West Germany
(also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group),
the Red Army Faction of Japan, the Weath-
ermen and Black Panthers in the USA, the
Tupamaros of Uruguay and several other
left-extremist terrorist groups sprang up
during the 1960s in different parts of the
world at the same time as the Naxalites and
Maoists in India.
LWE or Naxalism as it is called in India
took its roots from a village called Naxal-
bari in West Bengal. The movement was
started in 1967 by an extremist break-away
faction of the CPM, the Communist Party
of India (Marxist). This extremist faction
had a fairly extensive following among the
tea-garden labourers of the peasantry in the
area. In order to address their grievances,
Naxalites resorted to violence in accordance
with their ideology of a peoples' revolution-
ary movement. By 2004 there were several
Naxalite/Maoist groups operating in differ-
ent parts of the country and adhering to a
radical and extremist ideology. That same
year in a very significant development two
of the major groups – the Peoples' War
Group, operating in Andhra Pradesh, and
the Maoist Communist Centre in Bihar and
adjoining areas – merged to form the Com-
munist Party of India (Maoist). Since then,
the CPI (Maoist) has been seen as the most
active and strident front of Naxalism in the
country.
It is an accepted fact that Naxalites typically
operate in the vacuum created by the func-
tional inadequacy of field-level governance
structures, they espouse local demands, and
take advantage of the prevalent dissatisfac-
tion and feelings of perceived neglect and
injustice among the under-privileged and
remote segments of the population. Simul-
taneously, systematic efforts are made by
them to prevent the execution and imple-
mentation of development projects, to de-
liberately target critical infrastructure like
railways, roads, power and telecommunica-
tions, and to try and create an environment,
through violence and terror, where the gov-
ernance structures at field levels are shown
as being ineffective.1
Assessing the root causes of Naxalism, a
Planning Commission document outlines
eight reasons for the growth of the resis-
tance movement: sale and transfer of tribal
land to other people; indebtedness resulting
in the sale of land for inconsequential
amounts; eviction of tribals by non-tribal
people or government authorities; conver-
sion of land from community ownership
to individual ownership; treatment of
tribal people as encroachers on forest
land, depriving them of their traditional
source of livelihood; failure to give title
deeds for government land distributed to
tribal people; developments that disturb
the environment in tribal areas and force
indigenous people to move out; and large-
scale displacement because of development
projects such as multi-purpose irrigation
projects, power plants, mining projects and
urbanization.2
20 Vinod Anand
India's political leadership is confronted
with the challenge Naxalism poses to inter-
nal stability and economic development.
There is also a wide degree of recognition
in the polity that it is not merely a law en-
forcement problem but the phenomenon has
its root causes in socio-economic depriva-
tion. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has
observed that: "In many areas, the phe-
nomenon of Naxalism is directly related to
underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence
that it is the tribal areas that are the main
battleground of left-wing extremism today.
Large swathes of tribal territory have be-
come the hunting ground of left-wing ex-
tremists. Exploitation, artificially depressed
wages, iniquitous socio-political circum-
stances, inadequate employment opportu-
nities, lack of access to resources, under-
developed agriculture, geographical isola-
tion, lack of land reforms – all contribute
significantly to the growth of the Naxalite
movement".
After taking over the reins a second time, he
further observed in June 2009 that if LWE
continued to flourish in areas which have
natural resources of minerals, the climate for
investment would certainly be affected. He
resolved to implement a two-pronged ap-
proach to tackle Naxalism by ensuring the
development of regions breeding LWE while
maintaining law and order.
According to several estimates, a total of
170 districts and 14 states are afflicted with
the menace of 'red terror'; some to a lesser,
others to a greater degree (see Figure 1 for
map of the Naxal-affected areas). Lately,
there has also been a resurgence of Naxalism
in three tribal districts of West Bengal where
the incidence of Naxalism had declined in
recent years. From January to the first week
of June 2009 alone, there were over 900 in-
cidents of red terror resulting in the death of
123 Naxals and 155 security forces personnel
(see Figure 2 detailing fatality figures).
Figure 1:  Naxal-affected areas
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The casualties have been evidently more
than the violence-related casualties either in
Jammu and Kashmir or in the North East. In
the recent past there has been a concentration
of violent incidents and casualties mainly in
some districts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand
and, to some extent, in parts of Bihar and
Orissa. According to the 2008 report of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, these four states
together accounted for 80% of all incidents
of Naxal violence in the last three years.
Furthermore, the new government in its
action plan for the next 100 days and beyond
has included eliminating Naxalism as one
of its prime objectives. Statistical evidence
provides support to the Prime Minister's re-
cent assertion that Naxalism is the greatest
threat to security in India. Institutionaliza-
tion of Naxalism across Central India is ex-
pected to challenge the state over the next
decade or more.
Figure 2
Naxal violence: fatality figures
Data up to June 9, 2009
States Civilian Security
Forces
Naxal Total
Andhra Pradesh 5 0 7 12
Bihar 12 18 13 43
Jharkhand 28 24 33 85
Karnataka 0 0 0 0
Chhattisgarh 39 56 45 140
Maharashtra 5 34 15 54
Orissa 15 18 10 43
West Bengal 18 5 0 23
Uttar Pradesh 0 0 0 0
Tamil Nadu 0 0 0 0
Total* 122 155 123 400
Note: compiled from news reports and provisional.
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2008
States Civilian Security
Forces
Naxal Total
Andhra Pradesh 28 1 37 66
Bihar 35 21 15 71
Jharkhand 74 39 50 153
Karnataka 3 1 3 7
Chhattisgarh 35 67 66 168
Maharashtra 2 5 7 14
Orissa 24 76 32 132
West Bengal 19 4 1 24
Uttar Pradesh 0 0 2 2
Tamil Nadu 0 0 1 1
Total 210 214 214 638
2007
States Civilian Security
Forces
Naxal Total
Andhra Pradesh 24 4 45 73
Bihar 23 21 5 49
Jharkhand 69 6 45 120
Karnataka 1 1 6 8
Chhattisgarh 95 182 73 350
Maharashtra 9 2 8 19
Orissa 13 2 8 23
West Bengal 6 0 1 7
Uttar Pradesh 0 0 1 1
Total 240 218 192 650
Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics 23
2006
States Civilian Security
Forces
Naxal Total
Andhra Pradesh 18 7 127 152
Bihar 16 5 19 40
Jharkhand 18 47 29 94
Karnataka 0 0 1 1
Chhattisgarh 189 55 117 361
Maharashtra 13 3 33 49
Orissa 3 4 16 23
West Bengal 9 7 4 20
Uttar Pradesh 0 0 2 2
Total 266 128 348 742
1. Naxalism:
ideology-oriented terrorism
What is the ideology of LWE and what is
its genesis in India? The movement started
almost 40 years ago by the charismatic per-
sonality Charu Mazumdar may have lost its
intellectual and ideological moorings be-
cause of the way it has become criminalized
and yet it has now spread to around 170
districts all over the country. Its ideological
base has diminished and it now includes
many lumpen elements. But it also seems to
have some support from deprived and
alienated sections of the population. The
movement had its origins in the small vil-
lage of Naxalbari in West Bengal where on
the basis of the 'land-to-tiller' programme of
the state government, the poor peasants and
landless labour who expected to get only a
third of the produce (let alone some land)
were denied their just dues. From a small
incident in Naxalbari in May 1967 which
was ruthlessly suppressed by the police, the
movement based on Charu Mazumdar's
ideas of agrarian revolution has now be-
come a force of worrisome proportions. The
Prime Minister has repeatedly referred to it
as the biggest threat to internal security.
Charu Mazumdar was greatly influenced by
Maoist ideology and wanted to bring about
an armed revolution based on the ideology
and methods of the Chinese Communists
which had led them to victory in China. In
fact, during the height of the Cultural
Revolution in China, the People's Daily de-
scribed the uprising in May 1967 as "a peal
of spring thunder". He authored a series of
articles in the mid-sixties which formed the
basis of Naxalism and were referred to as
the "Historic Eight Documents". He and
his party, the Communist Party of India
(Marxist-Leninist) i.e. the CPI-ML, had
running fights with the Communist Party
government of West Bengal on ideology
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and methods to implement his revolutionary
ideas. A respected figure in the Naxalite
movement, his death in a police station in
July 1972 led to a temporary collapse of
central authority. There was continued pres-
sure to curb Naxal activities during 1975
when a state of emergency was declared by
Indira Gandhi. Meanwhile, there were many
splits and mergers within the Naxalite
groupings and left-wing parties.
After the 2004 merger of the two major
Maoist parties – the People's War Group
(PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre
(MCC) – into the CPI(M), a document titled
"Party Programme" was issued which con-
tains the ideological basis of the merged en-
tity. The document is replete with the erst-
while diatribes and jargon of the Maoist
brand of communism reminiscent of Maoist
China. Some of the important aspects of
Maoist ideology, thought processes and pre-
cepts are given in the following paragraphs.
The Party Programme document avers that
"The domination and control of the imperi-
alist finance capital in every sphere of our
life – economic, political, military and cul-
tural – continued to increase further and
further. Actually, the imperialists control
the key sectors of the Indian economy and
even the administration ... Recently, the
stranglehold of imperialist finance capital
over agricultural sector also continued to
tighten along with other sectors because
of WTO and imperialist globalization ...
Hence, India continues to be a semi-
colonial and semi-feudal country under the
neo-colonial form of imperialist indirect
rule, exploitation and control".3
According to the Maoists, globalization is a
war on the people and it is the ideology of
market fundamentalists. Market fundamen-
talists are destroying everything the nation
had possessed and preserved for centuries.
Further, they consider the Indian bureau-
cratic class to be one of the chief instruments
for imperialist exploitation and control over
India. Thousands of big imperialist multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) and transna-
tional corporations (TNCs) have been al-
lowed to operate. Through these policies im-
perialism is increasingly moving towards
trampling so-called sovereignty underfoot, in
the neo-colonial manner of semi-colonial
countries. Maoists further expound that there
are four major contradictions in their coun-
try, namely:
1. Contradiction between imperialism and
the Indian people;
2. Contradiction between feudalism and
the broad masses of the people;
3. Contradiction between capital and la-
bour;
4. Contradiction among the ruling classes.
The first two of these four major contradic-
tions are basic contradictions. These two
contradictions have to be resolved during
the current stage of the new democratic
revolution, and they also play the major or
dominant role in chalking out the overall
strategy for the current stage of the Indian
revolution.4
Further, Maoists consider the caste system to
be a specific form of social oppression and
exploitation affecting the oppressed castes
of the country. Most adivasis (aborigines/
tribals) are in the process of developing as
nationalities and the overwhelming majority
of them are the most suppressed and re-
pressed sections of Indian society. Maoists
envision that the new democratic revolution
will smash this imperialist and feudal ideol-
ogy and culture and will establish the new
democratic culture and socialist ideology.
And this is how they will do it: "For this it
will be necessary to smash the state ma-
chinery and all other centres of power of the
ruling classes thoroughly and build up the
democratic power of the people based on a
worker-peasant alliance. In this way, our
revolution will follow the path of the Chi-
nese Revolution".
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In addition the Maoists also consider urban
struggles to be very important, particularly
those of the working class. Their long-term
objective is to capture the big cities, the
'fortresses of the enemy'. During the last
phase of the so-called New Democratic
Revolution, Maoists aim to build a four-
class united front comprising all these
classes – the working class, peasantry, petty
bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie – un-
der the leadership of the working class
based on a worker-peasant alliance. The ul-
timate objective is to promote and establish
"Socialism and Communism on a world
scale" in India. Victory in revolution is to
be achieved through a three-pronged strat-
egy (termed the three 'magic weapons'):5
1. A strong revolutionary party based on
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its guiding
ideological basis in all matters;
2. A strong and well-disciplined people's
army under the leadership of such a party.
The people's army will primarily be built
through the armed agrarian revolution and
from among the landless poor peasants, agri-
cultural labourers and the working class;
3. A united front of all revolutionary classes
under the leadership of the proletariat based
on the worker-peasant alliance and on the
general programme of the people's demo-
cratic revolution. This united front will be
built in the course of advancing the armed
struggle and for the seizure of political
power through armed struggle.
In essence, the basic pillars of the Maoist
ideology are the annihilation of class ene-
mies, and violence as the means of securing
its goals. Recently, Koteshwar Rao alias
Kishanji, the deputy leader of India's CPI
(Maoist), observed that "the Islamic up-
surge should not be opposed as it is basi-
cally anti-US and anti-imperialist in nature.
We, therefore, want it to grow". He also
took pride in the fact that he had personally
ordered the attack on the West Bengal Chief
Minister in November 2008 which did not
succeed because at several places mice had
chewed up the cable connected to the im-
provised explosive device (IED).6 Earlier,
the ideologues of CPI (Maoist) have con-
sidered the Islamic upsurge as a progressive
anti-imperialist force in the contemporary
world. In their view it is wrong to describe
the struggle that is going on in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir,
Chechnya, and several other countries as a
struggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a
"clash of civilizations". In essence, Maoist
ideology avers that all these are national
liberation wars notwithstanding the role of
Islamic fundamentalists in these struggles.
2. Strategy and tactics
In order to put their ideology into practice,
Naxalites have been following the basic
tenet of Mao that "political power grows out
of the barrel of a gun". In their Congress
held in 2007 they resolved to intensify and
extend the "people's war" to all fronts by
taking the guerrilla war to a higher level
of mobile warfare in areas where it had
already reached an advanced stage and to
expand their areas of armed struggle to as
many states as possible.
An important element of this strategy was
the use of targeted violence to oppose the
establishment of Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) which were considered to be "neo-
colonial enclaves on Indian territory". Ac-
cording to Maoist precepts, SEZs are not
only seizing the fertile farmlands of the
peasants but are transforming the entire
country into special zones for the unhin-
dered ruthless exploitation and control by
imperialists and the big business houses. It
is ironical that in order to promote its eco-
nomic growth the Indian government had
emulated this idea from the land of Mao
where such radical ideology has long been
discarded. And that is why there has been a
spate of violent protests in Singhur and
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Nandigram in West Bengal and at other
places in states where SEZs are being
established or land is being acquired for big
projects and MNCs. This is particularly so
in West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa and
Chhattisgarh.
Economic targets were identified as the
main focus of the organization in the Febru-
ary 2007 Congress of the Maoists: "The 300
planned SEZs (Special Economic Zones)
are all set to create de facto foreign enclaves
within our country by grabbing lakhs of
acres of prime agricultural land by the for-
eign and local sharks. The Unity Congress
of the CPI (Maoist) calls on the people to
resist the seizure of their lands and houses
and beat back the demolition hordes by
whatever means possible".7 This strategy
was fostered in various ways with reports of
involvement of Naxal workers in rioting in
West Bengal's Special Economic Zone
(SEZ). The Naxals had tried to justify
their opposition to SEZs by describing the
concept of an economic zone as a modern
version of the old 'zamindari' system. The
minutes of the Congress meeting show the
Maoists planned to arm locals where SEZs
were proposed. The Annual Report of
the Central Military Commission of CPI
(Maoist) had outlined the plan to disrupt
several proposed infrastructure projects,
steel plants and mining projects. They also
planned to transform their current 'guerrilla'
units into 'mobile wings' capable of striking
in various parts of the country and then dis-
appearing.8
As part of the shift to increased mobile war-
fare, they have launched operations against
security units by deploying major forces of
200 to 300 guerrillas. This has led to heavy
casualties, economic disruption and large-
scale destruction. Some areas of Orissa,
Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh illustrate the
first stages of this phase of mobile warfare.
Government buildings and infrastructure
such as jails, police stations and railway
stations have been targeted. Attacks on rail-
ways have been classified by the railway
authorities as catastrophic node failures which
have destroyed the station, office, railway line
or cable. There are many more disruptive
node failures which do not lead to substantial
damage and hence go largely unreported.9
For instance, Naxals continued their strat-
egy of targeting jails by damaging on 28
January 2008 a jail under construction in
Orissa. Bihar has seen ten incidents of jail-
break in 2007 in different jails throughout
the state, including at Beur, Motihari and
Sasaram. The Naxals have found railway
infrastructure a lucrative target. Thus, the
East Central division of Indian Railways
which covers the states of Bihar, Jharkhand
and West Bengal has reported a rising trend
of Naxal attacks on railways. The statistics
of the last three years indicate that there has
been an almost hundred percent increase in
attacks on vital infrastructure.
Furthermore, the focus on economic war-
fare serves two purposes: it keeps develop-
ment beyond the reach of the common man
and increases the Naxals' access to finance
through extortion and ransom. On the macro
level, a Hindustan Times report quoting the
Indian Defence Yearbook claimed that
Naxalites in Jharkhand earned an annual
levy of 3.2 billion rupees or 10 percent of
the state's total revenue in a year. The mal-
aise is particularly rampant in Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar
and Andhra Pradesh. Given that most of
these states are rich in minerals, the Naxals
impose a levy on businesses, transporters
and contractors including those collecting
tendu leaves, an industry which is the main
source of agricultural income for the poor.
Rs 70,000 per annum are charged from coal
firms and Rs 25,000 per annum from trans-
porters. Political parties are also known to
pay Naxalite protection money. The salary
paid to Naxals is said to be Rs 1,000 to Rs
3,000 per month, with an insurance cover of
Rs 1.25 lakh if they die in encounters.
Home Ministry figures suggest Naxalites
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have a strength of 10,000 guerrillas and a
large number of modern arms and equip-
ment.
Since 2008 there have been increasing signs
that the Maoists would continue to focus on
economic targets, given the upsurge in in-
vestment in the mineral-rich states of
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. According to
government sources in 2007, Chhattisgarh
had succeeded in garnering Rs 107,899
crore (1 crore is equal to 10 million rupees)
of new investment.10 It is apparent that the
Maoists want to target this investment par-
ticularly since local aspirations remain un-
fulfilled, given that development is taking
place only in terms of the extraction of iron
ore and other minerals without any tangible
transfer of benefits to the local population.
In order to realize their goals of expanding
their struggle to new areas, the Maoists
have attempted to draw new states like
Jammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, Rajasthan,
Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya into their
fold. These are prosperous areas with large-
scale growth and development where
contracting can attract heavy levies for the
Naxals. Karnataka is emerging as another
area of concern. The once peaceful Malnad
region is wracked with the threat of Naxal-
ism. Regional, zonal and state committees
targeting urban cities and towns are report-
edly being set up. Two principal industrial
belts have been reportedly identified for ur-
ban mobilization – Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-
Kolkata and Mumbai-Pune-Surat-Ahmed-
abad.11
The destruction of economic infrastructure
serves a dual purpose, that of obliterating
state authority and threatening companies
with extortion. In October 2008 Maoists set
fire to the tower of Airtel, a private telecom
company, in the Dhotawa area of Katkam-
sandi in Bihar. Maoists had targeted this
telecom company as the management had
refused to pay them a levy of Rs 1 lakh over
the previous two years. They blasted high-
tension power lines in Bastar in June 2008,
which led to an eleven-day power outage in
six districts that affected mining operations
and the movement of ore from Bailadilla
mines. The National Mineral Development
Corporation is reported to have incurred a
loss of Rs 9 crore a day. Days after the
'Bastar blackout', the Maoists blew up the
control station of a mini hydel power gen-
eration unit at Sileru in the Donkarai area of
East Godavari District.12
As part of their larger strategy, Maoists also
enforce economic blockades, some of which
are inspired by a series of strikes (called
"chakka jams" – traffic blockades – in local
parlance) organized by the Maoist party in
Nepal. Naxals have carried out blockades
on several occasions; recently at the end of
April 2009 in Latehar. On such occasions
train services across the states have been
adversely affected. While major incidents
were avoided, some of the blockades have
not been without their share of bloodshed.
Maoists struck at two places late June 2008,
holding up traffic on national highways 33
in Jharkhand, and 42 in Orissa. Such block-
ades cripple economic activities, especially
in the transport sector. With businessmen
having low confidence in the law enforce-
ment agencies, they usually think it prudent
to withdraw trucks and other commercial
vehicles.13
According to the Maoists' list of targets,
projects identified by the Naxals on their hit
list include the bauxite mining project of the
Jindals group in Visakhapatnam, the Po-
lavaram irrigation project, steel plants pro-
posed by Tata Steel, Essar and Jindals steel
group companies in Chhattisgarh, the Cen-
tre's proposed railway line in the Rajhara-
Raighat-Jagdalpur sector, Posco's steel plants
(under construction) in Orissa, power plants
proposed by Reliance in Uttar Pradesh
and the Kosi irrigation project in northern
Bihar.14
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The rural sector is also not being ignored.
Pamphlets pasted in villages carried a
warning addressed to tribals in Bastar to
stop all farming activities in the region. The
Naxals have instructed peasants to join the
struggle instead of supporting private and
public sector companies which were said to
be harming the economy. Peasants who re-
sisted have been brutally killed.
Moreover, the Naxalites seem to be repeat-
ing some of their tactics from the 1969-72
period of attacks on political opponents, in
addition to attacking the police. For in-
stance, in West Bengal they have started
targeting specific CPM (the current ruling
party in West Bengal) functionaries at local
levels where such local leaders were mobi-
lizing support against the Naxalites. Their
targets are not confined to the familiar
Naxalite-affected districts of West Mid-
napore, Purulia and Bankura. During 2005-
08, a number of CPM party functionaries
were attacked and killed in the districts of
Nadia, Burdwan, Birbhum, Murshidabad,
etc. where the Naxalites were known to be
present in the 1970s. It shows that they have
been regrouping in some of the areas where
they had earlier influence in 1969-72. This
trend is likely to extend to other areas also.
Another element of Naxalite strategy has
been to disrupt elections so as to stall the
democratic process, especially in Chhattis-
garh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar.15 During
the polls in April 2009 a number of attacks
were carried out to discourage the common
people in Naxal-affected areas, especially
by taking advantage of the thinning out of
security forces for the national elections.
The objective again was to show the erosion
of the government's authority and the con-
solidation and enlargement of their own
control and influence amongst the populace.
As a perception management exercise they
had earlier warned the people to boycott the
polls.
Meanwhile the Maoists developed some ex-
pertise in the use of landmines and impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) which caused
very significant casualties among police and
other security personnel. The IEDs have
been increasingly used by the Naxalites in
well-planned attacks on even high-security
personalities in addition to other targets like
police stations and police vehicles. On a
rough estimate and in what is quite a dis-
turbing phenomenon, the Naxalites have so
far caused nearly 100 landmine explosions
every year, with considerable loss of life of
state security personnel and police.
There has been an increasing militarization
and simultaneous acquisition of sophisticated
firearms and ammunitions by the Naxalites.
Their arsenal now boasts of self-loading
rifles (SLRs), AK series of rifles and INSAS
rifles. It is believed that currently the Maoists
have also gained access to the technology of
fabricating rockets and rocket launchers. A
government report estimates that there are
9000-10,000 armed cadres with access to
about 6,500 firearms and in addition there
may be further 40,000 full-time cadres.16
Naxalites have also been able to establish a
basis in the Dandakaranya forest, spanning
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and
parts of Maharashtra. This area which is
also known as Abuj Mand is a 10,000 square
kilometre zone of unexplored forest with a
meagre population of 20,000 and hardly any
surface communications. This area is the size
of a small country such as Israel or Belgium.
Law enforcement agencies have hardly en-
tered this area. It is fast becoming a firm
base for the Maoists and its central location
facilitates the launching of operations, pro-
vision of training as well as rest and recu-
peration. Training camps in the area are
spread across three to four square kilome-
tres and even concrete bunkers have been
found there. The central government in
concert with the respective state govern-
ments has announced its intention to carry
out operations against the Maoists in this
area after the 2009 monsoons.17
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3. Government counter-strategy
The real key to fighting the Naxalites is
reliable and timely intelligence. Thus, ef-
fective integration of strategic and tactical
intelligence and information at police station
level is of vital importance. The approach
of the governments at both central and
state level is based on the triple pillars of
strengthening the police forces, promoting
development and improving the socio-
economic conditions of the affected areas
through a number of schemes.
In March 2006, the then Union Home Min-
ister outlined a 14-point strategy to deal
with the Naxal problem. Conceding that
Naxalism was not merely a law and order
problem, the government was to address
this menace simultaneously and in a holistic
manner in the areas of political security, de-
velopment and public perception manage-
ment. A collective and coordinated ap-
proach, improved police response and no
dialogue with the Naxalites unless they
agreed to give up violence and arms were
some of the points stressed in the strategy
document. Faster socio-economic develop-
ment, distribution of the land to the poor
and speedy implementation of land reforms,
restoration of government machinery, resto-
ration of people's faith in the government
and efficient use of mass media to highlight
the futility of Naxal violence and loss of life
and property were other key areas of atten-
tion in the government's strategy paper.
However, when strategy is often articulated
without being implemented it starts to ac-
quire the status of mere rhetoric and re-
peated platitudes.
There have been attempts to overcome the
difficulties of coordination and adopting a
unified approach by different state govern-
ments and the centre by setting up an 'Em-
powered Group' of Ministers headed by the
Home Minister and tasked with closely
monitoring the spread of the Naxal move-
ment, reviewing special measures to be
taken and improvement of inter-state coor-
dination in an exchange of intelligence, per-
sonnel and any other kind of assistance. A
Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of
concerned states under the chairmanship of
the Union Home Minister has been estab-
lished to work out a coordinated policy and
specific measures to deal with the Naxalite
problem on the political, security and de-
velopment fronts.
An inter-ministerial group has also been
formed to review and coordinate the work
being done to provide livelihood and
amenities to the deprived population. The
ministries of rural development, environ-
ment and forests, Panchayati Raj and the
Planning Commission have their repre-
sentatives on the committee, with the main
objective of bringing the alienated people
into the mainstream.
Development and security have been
merged under the aegis of the Naxal Man-
agement Division in the Union Home Min-
istry. It monitors the Naxal situation and
counter-measures being taken by the af-
fected states with the objective of improv-
ing ground-level policing and development
response in accordance with the location-
specific action plans formulated or to be
formulated by the affected states. It also re-
views whether the various development
schemes of the ministries and departments
for the Naxal-affected areas are being prop-
erly implemented and if the funds released
under such schemes are being optimally
utilized.
The government had also started a Back-
ward Districts Initiative in 2003-2004 under
which 55 of the worst-affected districts
were to receive considerable funds over a
period of three years. But for numerous bu-
reaucratic reasons there have been problems
in the utilization of these funds. This not
only highlights the apathy of the state gov-
ernments but also their inability to imple-
ment governmental strategy. Weak govern-
30 Vinod Anand
ance, political expediency and unwilling-
ness or reluctance of the police to enter for-
ested areas and strongholds of Naxals also
impedes the development activities. Similar
conditions prevail in other states.
Furthermore, since the Naxal problem is
directly related to the tribal and forested
areas, the government has been also making
efforts on the legislation front in the direc-
tion of recognizing the right of forest-
dwellers to forest produce. Another impor-
tant area on which central government has
been pushing the states is the introduction
of land reform. This remains a political is-
sue and various states have implemented
land reforms with mixed success. The states
which have effectively implemented land
reforms, for instance West Bengal and Ker-
ala, have witnessed a significant decline of
Naxalism.
Funds under the Police Modernization
Scheme have been given to the states to
modernize their police force in terms of
modern weaponry, latest communication
equipment, improvement of mobility and
other infrastructure including provision for
additional protection and fortification of
vulnerable police stations in Naxal areas.
The states are also being supplied with
mine-protected vehicles to counter the
landmine and IED attacks. However, the
Naxals have devised new means of defeat-
ing mine-protected vehicles by placing an
extraordinary amount of explosive charge in
the IEDs , as for example in Chhattisgarh.
By the December 2008 yearend review of
the Naxal situation, the government had put
into effect a number of measures to counter
the growing menace of left-wing extrem-
ism. In response to continued violence in
2009 the new UPA government is chalking
out a 100-day action plan for all ministries
and departments.18 The stress would be on
reorienting and fine-tuning its response to
Naxal violence. Improving ground-level
policing and acceleration of development
plans would be the two important prongs of
the new plan in addition to many other ele-
ments. Even though Multi-Agency Centres
have been established and operationalized,
the fact remains that Naxals are exploiting
the lack of intelligence and coordination
among the government agencies and the
police. However, in her outline of the cur-
rent government's resolve to meet the chal-
lenge of terrorism President Pratibha Patil
has stated that a National Counter Terrorism
Centre would be established to coordinate
multi-agency centres (MACs), operations,
intelligence and anti-terror measures at the
national level.19 The aim is to ensure that
"the centralized agency for collection and
collation of intelligence would be strength-
ened to ensure effective intelligence sharing
and processing ... Enhanced information
and intelligence sharing on a real-time basis
would be made possible by the creation of a
net-centric information command struc-
ture". Meanwhile, a succession of Naxal
attacks in the second week of June 2009 has
highlighted many flaws in the functioning
of the intelligence agencies and security
forces, including their training, arms and
tactics. These further underscore the urgent
need to implement the measures suggested.
Additional Central Paramilitary Forces have
been deployed on a long-term basis to quell
the Naxal violence and in the wake of the
Mumbai terror attack of 26 November 2008.
Up to 135,000 personnel are to be recruited
in a phased manner. A special counter-
insurgency force of central paramilitary
forces designated COBRA is also being
raised to counter Naxal violence. India Re-
serve battalions have been sanctioned in
Naxal-affected states not only to strengthen
the security apparatus but also to wean
away youth from rebel activity by providing
them with gainful employment. Even as the
action plan for the anti-Maoist offensive is
being finalized, the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs is working to significantly strengthen
both infrastructure and the arsenal to coun-
ter Naxal forces. The forthcoming budget
Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics 31
will see a major increase in allocation for
this purpose.
There are also plans to set up three to four
specialized anti-Maoist centres at strategic
locations – mainly at inter-state borders –
each equipped with about five helicopters.
The centres would be manned by the Cen-
tral Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and pilots
from the Border Security Force (BSF), Army
and Air Force. The government has even
approved the use of Indian Air Force assets
like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
reconnaissance and gathering of intelligence
in Naxal-affected areas. An auxiliary force
of ex-servicemen drawn from the Naxal-
affected areas is also being formed to carry
out duties such as detecting mines and ex-
plosive devices laid by Naxalites.
Training the police force is another aspect
which has been receiving greater attention
in states like Andhra Pradesh and Chattis-
garh which are providing special training to
counter the well-trained and motivated
Naxal guerrillas and fighters. Chattisgarh
started a Counter-Terrorism and Jungle
Warfare College in Kanker three years ago
where police are given rigorous training in
guerrilla warfare and trainees live in the open
in the dense jungles of Bastar and learn to
live off the land. Training is modelled on
the Army's Counter-Insurgency and Jungle
Warfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram.
Other states have started sending their po-
lice personnel to the college for training.
Even if all of the above were to happen, one
of the weakest areas has been the lack of a
coordinated approach by political parties to
the scourge of Naxalism. The events in June
2009 in the case of the Maoist resurgence in
the Lalgarh area of West Midnapore district
in West Bengal were a classic example of
political expediency, lack of coordination
between various agencies, frictions between
the centre and state governments especially
when both are of different hues, the sorry
state of training and equipment especially of
the state police forces, and above all a lack of
unified political will in dealing with a men-
ace that has been declared the single largest
threat to the security of India. One stark les-
son which emerged from the Lalgarh crisis
was that while political parties may play
their opportunistic games in other arenas, in
the realm of national security this is the
equivalent of playing with fire. Those in re-
sponsible positions are duty-bound to uphold
the rule of law. The only beneficiaries of
political one-upmanship are those who are
fighting against the state. In such a murky
game, political leadership ends up becoming
an unintended abettor of the outlaws.
4. Concluding observations
If there is one lesson to be learned from
history, it is that economic and social de-
velopment cannot take place in an environ-
ment of insecurity. Security and develop-
ment are intimately related as development
cannot proceed without security, and lack of
development becomes a cause for alienation
of the people and leads to insecurity. Fur-
ther, the abrogation of the government's
own responsibility for governance, as in the
case of the situation in the Dandakaranya
forests (Abuj Mand) where rebels are almost
running their own parallel government, fur-
ther erodes the authority of government and
the faith of people in the government. In
addition, the Naxals gain respectability,
strength and revenue resources to perpetu-
ate their vested interests.20
Furthermore, movements such as the anti-
Naxalite Salwa Judum may appear to be at-
tractive on the face of it, and yet the people
involved in such movements become iso-
lated and sitting targets for the Maoists.21
Such people require the protection of the
police and in the case of this particular
movement, 45,000 to 50,000 people have
been displaced to become refugees in their
own land, thereby further complicating the
situation.
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Lack of political will to implement land
reforms, political expediency and sheer
inertia in utilizing allotted funds for de-
velopment as well as a disjointed ap-
proach to the problems of the populace
still remain the main causes promoting
Naxalism. Although the government with
its long experience of tackling insurgency
has come up with a good strategy to deal
with Naxalism, it is at the implementation
level where concerted efforts are still
needed.
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Islamic terrorism in India:
organizations, tentacles and networks
Animesh Roul
For decades now, India has been facing vari-
ous forms and waves of terrorist violence
ranging from separatist and ethnic terrorism
to ideological and religion-driven terrorism.
With the emergence of new and hybrid terror
organizations and conglomerates, there has
been a sea change in the nature of terror tac-
tics, technology and the way terror tentacles
and networks have spread in the hinterlands
of India and beyond.
India battles terror violence in three major
geographical zones: Jammu and Kashmir
(jihadi separatist, cross-border terrorism),
Northeastern States (separatists, ethno-Isla-
mist, cross-border terrorism) and Central-
Eastern States (Left-wing Extremism/
Naxalism). However, since the 13 December
2001 terror attack on the Indian Parliament
in New Delhi that marked the beginning of
this century, the country has been experi-
encing serious menaces from Islamic terror-
ist groupings that have infiltrated into India
mostly from neighbouring countries with the
sole objective of perpetrating the so-called
Islamic jihad. With the expansion of terror
bases and sleeper cells across the country,
these terror groups are increasing their ac-
tivities in the urban centres of India, target-
ing strategic infrastructures and financial
lifelines of the country in order to cripple it.
Before the December 1992 demolition of
Babri Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya in the
north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, terrorism
in India was to some extent synonymous
with the Khalistan movement in Punjab
which was separatist in nature. Subse-
quently, Pakistan-sponsored cross-border
terrorism emerged as a proxy war strategy
which later developed into a systematic
terrorist movement against India.
This paper focuses on Islamic terrorism in
India, with particular attention to the major
groups operating and perpetrating violence
in the country and their operational and lo-
gistical linkages with each other.
At least two sets of players are involved in
terrorism in India. The first set comprises
Pakistani and Bangladesh-based terror
groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-
e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi
Islami (HuJI). The second set is composed of
a network of disgruntled Muslim youth, stu-
dents and criminal elements which largely
work as a support system, e.g. the Student
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Past
research has shown that a small section of
India's Muslims – now called home-grown
jihadists – has taken to terrorism and has ac-
quired international links in recent times.
Terrorism among Indian Muslims appears to
have originated following the Babri Mosque
demolition in 1992. Since then, the potential
for home-grown terrorism has grown exten-
sively throughout the country and was fur-
ther aggravated by the 2002 Gujarat com-
munal riots.
In recent times, JeM and LeT along with the
HuJI-Bangladesh are collectively utilizing
India's porous eastern border for anti-India
activities by establishing 'surrogate bases' in
neighbouring Bangladesh, Nepal and in the
Middle East for the movement of trained
cadres and finances for their operations.
These groups are recruiting Indian youths,
sending them to Pakistan for training and
re-inducting them via Bangladesh to carry
out terrorist attacks in India's heartland.
Many recent terror strikes like the serial
blasts in Delhi, twin blasts in Varanasi,
mosque and market blasts in Hyderabad and
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the Mumbai carnage are the results of the
collective efforts of these groups.
The Union Ministry of Home Affairs of
the Government of India has noted in its
Annual Reports that involvement by JeM,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Bangladesh-
based HuJI has been observed in most of
the terror strikes in the country. And the re-
cent emergence of Indian Mujahideen (IM)
as a home-grown, indigenous jihadi organi-
zation with active support from all Pakistan-
based terror groups has created new fears
in the Indian security establishment. Most
disturbingly, these groups have been using
their sleeper cells to carry out urban and
mass casualty attacks.
1. Major terror organizations
operating in India
1.1 Lashkar-e-Taiba
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) is the
most deadly Pakistan-based terror organi-
zation that has been perpetrating the maxi-
mum number of attacks in India's heartland.
Apart from its traditional area of operation
in Jammu and Kashmir, the group has
spread its tentacles from Western Gujarat to
the eastern border of Manipur and West
Bengal, and from the southern state of Ker-
ala to Jammu and Kashmir in the North.
The LeT is the military wing of the erstwhile
religious organization, Markaz Da'wat wa'l
Irshad (MDI), which later changed its name
into Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) following the
9/11 events in the USA when the Lashkar
group was banned and declared a Foreign
Terrorist Organization by the United States.
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is the chief of
Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some of the prominent
LeT operatives are Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi,
Yahiya Mujahid (spokesman), Abdullah
Muntazer Gaznavi (media handler) and Abu
Hamza.
LeT's presence in J&K was first detected af-
ter many Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries
infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC)
in tandem with the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz, a
terrorist group then active in the Poonch dis-
trict of J&K in the early 1990s. However, the
first ever attack was reported in August 1992
when LeT militants killed nearly 19 Indian
Army soldiers in J&K.1 At a meeting held at
Tehran in 1993, the LeT had forged an un-
derstanding with the Jammu and Kashmir
People's Conference (JKPC) and Al Barq.
This paved the way for their joint operation
and mission in J&K.
The JUD/LeT and their leaderships are af-
filiated to the Ahle Hadith school of thought,
a reformist Islamic movement.2 The objec-
tives of LeT are to establish Nizam-e-
Mustafa (God's government) in the world
and the merger of J&K with Pakistan. At the
behest of Pakistan's ISI, it later added anti-
India goals: to destabilize India and impede
its economy. LeT has introduced fidayeen
missions (suicide tactic used by terrorists) in
Jammu and Kashmir and has intermittently
struck in India's heartlands with its tactics of
indiscriminate shooting and grenade attacks.
Pakistan's July 2009 dossier admitted for the
first time that the LeT carried out the 26 No-
vember 2008 multiple Mumbai attacks. The
dossier named senior LeT operative Zaki-ur-
Rehman Lakhvi as the mastermind. Among
many of its signature acts, LeT operatives
carried out the October 2005 serial bomb ex-
plosions in Delhi and the December 2005
attack on the Indian Institute of Science
campus in Bangalore. With a penchant for
attacking security forces, especially the
paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF), LeT carried out an audacious attack
on a CRPF recruitment centre in Rampur,
Uttar Pradesh, on 1 January 2008.3 This New
Year's Day attack on the CRPF recruitment
centre was considered to be the dress re-
hearsal for the Mumbai mayhem later that
year, and it came just over a month after the
November 2007 multiple blasts in court
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premises in three major cities of Uttar
Pradesh: Lucknow, Faizabad and Varanasi.4
1.2 Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet) is
a Pakistani-based terrorist grouping mainly
active in Jammu and Kashmir in its initial
phase, but later collaborating with LeT for
terror acts beyond J&K. Maulana Masood
Azhar is the supreme leader of JeM which is
a splinter group of Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami
(HuJI), an Islamic organization that was
formed in the early 1980s to fight the war
against the former Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan. JeM's leader Maulana Masood Azhar
was a member of HuJI before he established
his own organization on 31 January 2000 in
Karachi in Pakistan.5 Before that, Azhar was
one of the three jailed terrorists released
from prison in India in December 1999 in
exchange for hostages in the hijacked Indian
Airlines Flight IC-814.6
In common with other J&K-centric organi-
zations, this group believes in the secession
of the state with the ultimate aim of merger
with Pakistan and the destabilization of In-
dia. The group claims that each of its offices
in Pakistan would serve as schools of jihad.
Most of the Jaish-e-Mohammed terror acts
are fidayeen (suicide terrorist) attacks in
which terrorists of the organization storm a
high-security target, including security
forces' bases, camps and convoys before they
are killed by retaliatory action.
The unit is closely linked through the Bi-
noria madrassa in Karachi with the former
Taliban regime of Afghanistan and its pro-
tégé Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida
network. The JeM is also reported to have
links with Sunni terrorist groups operating in
Pakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Paki-
stan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and
Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and
Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Its activity
has been expanded to many other parts of
the country, including the Indian Parliament
attack on 13 December 2001. Prior to this,
JeM had perpetrated a similar kind of suicide
operation in storming the J&K Legislative
Assembly in October 2001 and killing nearly
35 persons, including 10 security force per-
sonnel.
1.3 Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami
Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami, the 'Movement of
Islamic Holy War', has emerged as the larg-
est international Sunni Islamic jihadi organi-
zation created in and by Pakistan after the
Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is broadly based in two
countries as HuJI-Pakistan and HuJI-
Bangladesh (HuJI-B), whereby the latter is
more potent than the former. HuJI-B cadres
are active in India and they are mostly in-
filtrated from India's eastern corridors. The
organization has perpetrated attacks in col-
laboration with other Pakistani-based groups
such as JeM, LeT and home-grown radicals
from the Student Islamic Movement of India
(SIMI). HuJI has existed in the subcontinent
since the early 1980s with active support
from Pakistan-based Deobandi religious
bodies, including the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-
Islami (JuI), and most recently it has set up
Indian units in Uttar Pradesh. It also has
bases in Rajasthan, Karnataka, Maharashtra
and Andhra Pradesh.
With direct logistical help from LeT, JeM
and SIMI, HuJI has coordinated many at-
tacks in India in the recent past including the
March 2006 Sankatmochan Temple blast in
Varanasi. HuJI's involvement in the May
2007 twin blasts in Hyderabad and in the
serial bomb blasts of May 2008 in Jaipur
came to light during the investigations.
HuJI defined itself as the second line of de-
fense for every Muslim.7 Its initial objective
was to organize relief camps for the Afghan
mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war.
Afterwards, it began to recruit and train
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mujahideen with support from ISI and grew
as a terrorist grouping. Since it has different
units in different countries, it has multiple
objectives and activities. HuJI contingents
operating in Pakistan or Jammu and Kash-
mir initially focused on liberating J&K, but
its current mobilization outside J&K dem-
onstrates its present strategy to spread ter-
rorism across the country and destabilize
India with support from the proscribed Stu-
dents Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),
ISI and other Islamist extremists.
Apart from having a base in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, J&K and some other pockets in
India, by 2005 the group had spread its
tentacles to almost 24 countries, including
Chechnya, Fiji, Iran, Ireland, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and parts of Africa and the Middle East.8 In
March 2008, the US blacklisted Harakat-
ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) for
attacks in India and other countries, as a
"global terrorist organization".9
1.4 Indian Mujahideen
Indian Mujahideen (IM) has emerged as a
well-organized jihadi terrorist group in In-
dia, claiming responsibility for a number of
terror attacks perpetrated in various urban
centres of India during 2007-2008. Even
though the exact moment of IM's formation
is not known, the recent arrest of a number
of IM operatives has revealed its possible
existence and involvement in terror strikes
in India as far back as late October 2005.
The name "Indian Mujahideen" was report-
edly conceived at a terrorist conclave at-
tended by top leaders of the Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami
(HuJI) in Pakistani-administered Kashmir
in early May 2008.
IM came into the open for the first time in
November 2007, when simultaneous bomb
blasts targeted lawyers in court premises in
three Uttar Pradesh cities: Varanasi, Faiza-
bad and Lucknow. IM described the attacks
as "Islamic raids" and justified them as re-
venge against lawyers who had allegedly
assaulted a couple of Jaish-e-Muhammad
terrorist suspects. IM also alleged that the
lawyers had refused to take cases involving
other alleged terrorists, including suspected
HuJI leader and Phulpur-based Islamic cleric
Muhammad Waliullah, the alleged master-
mind of the March 2006 Sankatmochan
temple blasts in Varanasi.
Basically, members of IM are mainly drawn
from proscribed organizations such as the
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),
the Pakistan-based LeT and the Bangladesh-
based HuJI. IM's email statements indicate
their ties with SIMI when they put forward
demands for the release of SIMI cadres un-
der detention or serving jail terms. However,
the newly emerged IM continues to deny any
connection with Pakistan, Bangladesh, or
any of their agencies (e.g. Pakistan's Inter-
Services Intelligence [ISI] and Bangladesh's
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
[DGFI]). It also denies any links with terror-
ist groups such as LeT and HuJI.
The Indian Mujahideen has been trying to
garner support from India's teeming Muslim
population, often by raising indigenous
issues in its manifestos. Since the Uttar
Pradesh court attacks, IM, as a home-grown
jihadi unit, has claimed responsibility for at
least four major terror strikes in 2008 that
targeted civilians. Each attack came with
prior emails to the media citing a list of anti-
Muslim atrocities in the country. The group
justifies the violence by tagging the terror
campaign as the "rise of Jihad" and the re-
venge of "Gujarat".10
The top leaders have been identified as Ri-
yaz Bhatkal, Abdul Subhan Qureshi Amir
Reza, Iqbal Bhatkal, Muhammad Khalid,
Shahzad Ahmed, and Ariz Khan. The most
surprising revelation has been the many IT
professionals found to be involved in IM's
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activities, including wealthy professionals
Asghar Peerbhoy, Salman Kadar Shaikhand,
and Asif Bashiruddin Shaikh, who have
played pivotal roles in generating funds for
the organization and planning attacks.11
The Indian Mujahideen has four wings, each
wing having a distinct responsibility for
spreading terror in India with the active as-
sistance of LeT:12 Shahabuddin Ghouri Bri-
gade which is headed by Amir Raza and
largely responsible for planning and exe-
cuting attacks in southern India.
The Muhammad Ghaznavi Brigade is re-
sponsible for planning and executing terror
strikes in northern India and Shaheed-al-
Zarqawi Brigade is responsible for targeting
political and other important personalities of
the country as well as organizing suicide
attacks. IM has a media wing which is
headquartered in Pune, Maharashtra. The
wing is responsible for email and print me-
dia communications and press releases of
manifestos before or after the blasts.
The arrest of IM cadres from different loca-
tions demonstrates the geographical spread
of a terror network that now spans the
length and breadth of India – possibly even
extending into neighbouring states.
1.5 Students Islamic Movement of India
(SIMI)
SIMI was founded in 1977 at the University
of Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, as a radical stu-
dent organization. The interlinked triad of
the ummah, caliphate and jihad determined
SIMI's postures and activities in the country
thereafter – the group's logo includes a
Quran, an AK-47 assault rifle and a globe.
SIMI started as a united platform for Muslim
students and youth in the country, with the
objective of restoring the caliphate to bring
about the unity of the ummah by rejecting
the concept of nationalism, secularism and
democracy. The group's aim was to establish
Dar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) by using vio-
lence, if necessary, to convert non-Muslims.
In the early 1990s, SIMI activists were in-
doctrinated by Pakistan's ISI and travelled
far and wide to garner support. The grouping
convened an Ikhwanul (Muslim Brother-
hood) conference in Kanpur city in October
1999 which was attended by around 20,000
people including Sheikh Yaseen (Hamas),
Qazi Hussain Ahmed (JI, Pakistan) and the
imam of the Al-Aqsa mosque. In 2001, SIMI
again convened a mass conclave in Mumbai,
especially for Muslim youths. It was here
that SIMI urged fellow Indian Muslims to
launch an armed jihad in India with the es-
tablishment of an Islamic caliphate as the
goal. The SIMI network is actively involved
in conversion in the southwestern states of
India.
Kashmir-centric Pakistani terrorist groups
like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba
and Jaish-e-Muhammad have had strong
logistical and operational ties with SIMI.
In late 2002, Maharashtra police seized as
many as 30 compact discs containing
speeches of Maulana Masood Azhar, chief
of Jaish-e-Muhammad, along with clippings
of communal riots in Gujarat from SIMI
offices in Aurangabad. Also, SIMI's pro-
Taliban stance in the wake of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, the group's anti-US demon-
strations in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, and
SIMI's glorification of Osama bin Laden as
the ultimate "jihadi" prompted the Indian
government to impose a ban on the group in
2001.13
After the government proscription, SIMI
operated closely with the Hyderabad-based
Tehreek Tahaffuz-e-Shair-e-Islam and the
radical Islamic vigilante unit, the Darsgah
Jihad-o-Shahadat ("Institute for Holy War and
Martyrdom") which has countrywide centres
teaching self-defense to Muslim youths, and
aims to make the Quran the constitution of
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India.14 SIMI also operated through the Is-
lamic Youth Front in Kerala and the Tamil
Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam.
Intelligence agencies have established SIMI's
involvement in major terrorist strikes in In-
dia and believe that the organization has
created the country's first home-grown ter-
ror network called the Indian Mujahideen
(IM). SIMI attempts to indoctrinate youths
by convincing them to fight for Islam. To
accomplish this goal, SIMI uses provocative
audio and video clippings which selectively
depict the atrocities committed against
Muslims from Gujarat to Kashmir and from
Bosnia to Afghanistan.
Having originally started as a student
movement, SIMI has in due course become a
major radical Islamist movement with a
strong presence in most of the northern and
southern states of India. SIMI, along with
other militant groups, has jointly carried out
many terrorist acts including the 13 Septem-
ber 2008 serial blasts in Delhi and multiple
explosions in Ahmadabad and Jaipur as well
as blasts in the Uttar Pradesh courts in the
recent past.
SIMI has operational ties with many foreign
militant student groups, including the Saudi
Arabian Jamayyatul Ansar (JA), whose
membership comprises former SIMI activists
and expatriate Indian Muslims.
2. Ties and tentacles
The previous section has described terror
networks, the occasionally symbiotic rela-
tions among terror groups operating in the
region, and their geographical distribution.
Relying on recent investigations into vari-
ous terrorists events, this section looks more
closely into the intricate ties between LeT
and other terror groupings and how their
terror tentacles have been spreading in the
region and beyond.
For the past few years terrorist units have
been trying to increase their geographical
span by operating in southern and western
parts of the Indian states Goa, Karnataka,
Kerala, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. In
fact, there are reports of terrorist groups
poised to infiltrate into the country through
the coastlines and island provinces of Indian
southern territories. For instance, the LeT
has already established a Marine Jihad Unit
to operate against India.15 Besides the usual
routes of intrusion in Jammu and Kashmir,
LeT has managed to build alternate routes
through the porous borders of Nepal and
Bangladesh as well while establishing bases
in the Gulf countries. Investigating agencies
have now confirmed that LeT is working on
a new strategy which involves using Dubai
as the centre of planning for future strikes
against India. Past and ongoing terror inves-
tigations suggest the Gulf countries have
been major hubs for LeT terrorists, and
many terrorist plots against India are now
hatched outside Pakistan's territory. The re-
cent arrest and interrogation of a top LeT op-
erative and close confidant of Hafiz Saeed
revealed the future terror plans in the coun-
try. Md Umer Madni who was arrested in the
capital Delhi had been in touch with LeT's
Hafiz Saeed since 2000 and was involved in
"talent scouting" for the Lashkar-e-Taiba in
India.16 Madni is also the LeT commander in
Nepal. He confessed to having travelled far
and wide inside the country and also in
neighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh with the
purpose of jihadi recruitment, fund-raising
activities, and sending youths to terror train-
ing camps in Pakistan-Administered Kash-
mir. He had claimed to know terror master-
minds Sabahuddin and Fahim Ansari who
were arrested and accused of the November
2008 Mumbai attacks.
The recent spurt of terror activities by the
LeT in India is directly linked to contribu-
tions from the Gulf-based cells that have
planned and financed most of the group's op-
erations. The LeT's Gulf-based networks are
becoming the lifeline for LeT/JuD operations
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in Pakistan and India. Investigations by In-
dia's intelligence agencies into the 2008
urban attack uncovered ties to many Gulf
countries, especially the financial networks
in Muscat, Oman. At least four LeT opera-
tives handled India operations from Gulf
cities such as Muscat and Sharjah. They are
identified as Wali, Muslim Basheer, Sarfaraz
Nawaz and Abu Haroon. These four are be-
lieved to be of Pakistani origin and to have
been deputed in the Gulf to raise funds and
monitor operations planned for India. While
Wali was involved in fundraising activities
and was responsible for coordinating with
SIMI and IM militants in India, Muslim
Basheer, based in Muscat, was the chief co-
ordinator for the LeT in the Gulf. Funds for
terrorist operations were raised by Wali, who
provided the money for the blasts and who
sent youths from the southwestern state of
Kerala to Pakistan-Administered Kashmir
(PAK) for terrorist training.17
Investigating agencies identified Abu Ha-
roon, a travel agent in Muscat, as the opera-
tive who facilitated the movement of money
to India from the Gulf region through hawala
channels. Abu Haroon also coordinated be-
tween the Lashkar leadership in Pakistan and
India. The fourth terrorist, Sarfaraz Nawaz,
another LeT man from Muscat and a former
SIMI leader was brought from Muscat to In-
dia recently in an extraordinary rendition by
India's external intelligence agency in early
2009. Also, three other terrorists involved in
the July 2008 Bangalore serial blasts and
other incidents have been identified as
Saleem and Jaheed from Bangladesh (ha-
wala operators) and Ali Abdul Azeez Hooti
of Oman, the chief terrorist financier.
The Gulf's increasing ties to terrorism resur-
faced when investigations into the November
2008 Mumbai carnage tracked a similar
pattern involving Gulf-based financiers and
Lashkar coordinators. The role of Aziz
Hooti as one of the financiers in this con-
nection is currently under investigation.
Hooti, the Oman-based businessman and
key Lashkar operative there, was in touch
with LeT's Fahim Ansari just before the No-
vember 2008 carnage in Mumbai. According
to the information shared between Oman and
Indian police, Aziz Hooti could have had di-
rect ties to the Mumbai attackers. It is now
believed in investigating circles that both
Aziz Hooti and Nawaz played vital roles in
financing terrorist activities in India, espe-
cially in providing funds for Indians under-
going jihadi training in the PAK region.
Nawaz's interrogation has revealed many
facts about Lashkar's plans in southern India.
According to his statement, he and Ummer
Haji, an IM cadre and key figure in the terror
network in south India, had hatched a plan to
carry out serial bomb blasts in Chennai and
Bangalore. However, Lashkar's Chennai plot
was dropped by Wali due to funding issues.
Haji is the man who sent Kerala youths to
Muzaffarabad in Kashmir for training. Aziz
Hooti was also involved in the Bangalore
plan while the terrorist triumvirate (Wali,
Nawaz and Hooti) met in Sharjah in early
2008. Nawaz's statement also sheds some
light on Lashkar's operational strategy in
southern India.
The beginning of 2009 was marked by a
crackdown by Islamabad on the LeT and
other Pakistan-based terror groups in which
LeT came under severe pressure from the
Pakistan administration to de-escalate its
jihadi agenda against India. Despite the
crackdown and the detention and subse-
quent release of LeT leaders in Pakistan, the
LeT is reportedly once again looking to
strike India by plotting against its vital in-
stallations and infrastructure.
3. Conclusion
It can be argued that in India the Kashmir-
centric cross-border terrorism fuelled by
Islamabad's territorial ambition and proxy
war strategy has recently become fodder for
Islamic extremists to spread their tentacles
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beyond Jammu and Kashmir. Although the
Federal government has proscribed numer-
ous organizations for their anti-India activi-
ties, many are still flourishing with political
and religious patronage from across the
borders. Groupings like HuJI, LeT, Jaish
and Hizb are still targeting India and getting
all their support from Pakistan's ISI and its
Bangladeshi counterpart, Directorate General
of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), who have
formed a deadly alliance against India. It
must be noted that most of these above-
mentioned terrorist groups are members of
Osama bin Laden's International Islamic
Front and have vowed to fight for the Mus-
lim ummah (the community of believers).
India has been experiencing cross-border ter-
rorism from its eastern frontier too. The ter-
ritory of Bangladesh has been used as a safe
haven for various militant groups operating
in India's northeastern states and elsewhere.
There is clear evidence that the growing Is-
lamization of northeast India has been fa-
cilitated by Pakistan's ISI and spurred by
political instability in bordering Bangladesh.
The extremely violent United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA) is now in the grips
of ISI and DGFI along with Muslim United
Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA).
Also, the recent arrest of a Lashkar-e-Taiba
operative, Mufti Obaidullah, revealed the
spreading networks of LeT in neighbouring
Bangladesh. Obaidullah who is originally
from India's West Bengal state told his inter-
rogators that his task was to organize jihad
in Bangladesh in cooperation with HuJI18
and Bangladesh-based Jam'atul Mujahedin
of Bangladesh (JMB) operatives.
It can be argued that Indian Muslims are
susceptible to the global jihadi agenda and
the worldwide Islamist call for a Muslim
caliphate. However, there is a difference of
opinion about the current growth of the
homegrown jihadi threat in India. One sec-
tion of scholars which includes the political
elites (secular parties like the Samajwadi
Party, Congress and other pro-Muslim re-
gional parties) hold that Indian Muslims are
quite immune to the global jihadist move-
ment, and that the call for the same from
Bin Laden, Al-Qaida or LeT does not im-
pact Indian Muslims.
Another school of thought argues that this
mindset of the Indian Muslim is fast erod-
ing and that the last couple of decades have
witnessed many Indian youths falling prey
to jihadist thought and its agenda, perhaps
as a result of concerted efforts from Paki-
stan and Gulf-based agencies.
This discourse notwithstanding, there do
exist minuscule but strong jihadi elements
which often raise the issue of J&K, the Gu-
jarat pogrom and the Babri Mosque demoli-
tion in the context of global as well as Indian
Muslim suffering. They are now also backed
by pro-Muslim human rights activists and
anti-violence NGOs and political or religious
groupings. Since the November 2008 Mum-
bai attacks, the Ministry of Home Affairs has
accepted that terrorist groups including LeT
and JeM have found support among dis-
gruntled elements within India.
India cannot remain in permanent denial
that there is no involvement of Indian-born
Muslims in international terror events: they
have been implicated in incidents like the
UK terror plots, and include terrorist sus-
pects such as Dhiren Barot, Haroon Aswat,
and Kafeel Ahmed. India figures intermit-
tently in the jihad propaganda of Al-Qaida
and LeT. Al Qaeda's Adam Yahiye Gadahn
and the group's deputy commander Ayman
al-Zawahiri have made calls in many videos
for attacks against India. Masood Azhar and
Hafeez Saeed constantly target India in their
regular preaching and often directly brain-
wash youths to unleash jihad against India.
The radicalized – read Talibanized – neigh-
bours of India have also had an indirect im-
pact on the mindset of Indian Muslims and
made them less tolerant towards other re-
ligions and society at large.
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This is the current reality in India: there is a
new phase of Islamic extremism emerging
in the country, with home-grown jihadists
raising their heads and major terror group-
ings choosing to combine forces and opt for
a collective execution of terror plans.
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Der pakistanisch-afghanische Problemverbund
Hein G. Kiessling
Im April 2008 betreute ich im Auftrag
des ISB-Büros der KAS eine Woche lang
neun afghanische Universitätsprofessoren in
Islamabad und in Peschawar. Fünf der Pro-
fessoren waren Paschtunen, vier von ihnen
zugleich die Rektoren großer Universitäten
ihres Landes. Bei ihren Begegnungen mit
pakistanischen Kollegen und Studenten der
Universitäten von Karachi, Islamabad und
Peshawar wurden sie primär mit drei Fragen
konfrontiert:
1. Wann sorgt ihr dafür, dass die neuen
ausländischen Okkupanten Afghanistan
verlassen?
2. Wann werden die indischen General-
konsulate in Afghanistan geschlossen?
3. Wann erkennt Kabul die Durand-Line
endlich offiziell an?
Die Antwort der afghanischen Besucher
war eindeutig. Sie verneinten die Anwesen-
heit ausländischer Okkupanten in ihrem
Lande und verwiesen darauf, dass Pakistan
wie Indien vier Generalkonsulate in Afgha-
nistan habe. In Sachen Durand-Linie war
die Antwort der Afghanen besonders deut-
lich. Diese sei Afghanistan 1893 in einer
Periode seiner Schwäche aufgezwungen
worden, sie sei für einen Zeitraum von
100 Jahren konzipiert gewesen und diese
seien vorüber. Eine Anerkennung dieser
Grenze würde eine soziale Spaltung und
Schwächung des paschtunischen Volkes
bedeuten, die nicht akzeptabel seien.
Die Lehrer und Studenten der Universitäten
von Karachi, Islamabad und Peshawar zeig-
ten sich von den klaren Aussagen sichtlich
irritiert. Für das 1947 geborene Pakistan,
das seinerseits die Kashmir-Frage seit über
60 Jahren auf dem Feuer hält, stellt die Du-
rand-Linie eine endgültige Grenze dar. In
Kabul aber hält man sich in der Grenzfrage
weiterhin bedeckt. Man weiß, dass man am
Status quo derzeit nichts ändern kann, ver-
sucht aber, die Türen für künftige Möglich-
keiten offen zu halten. Bei einem Auseinan-
derbrechen Pakistans würde Kabul hier mit
Sicherheit Ansprüche geltend machen.
1. Die 70er-Jahre
Die Nichtanerkennung der Durand-Grenze
durch Afghanistan führte bereits in den frü-
hen 70er-Jahren zu Spannungen zwischen
beiden Ländern. Im Oktober 1972 führte die
Unzufriedenheit der Marri-, Mengal- und
Bizenjo-Stämme in Balochistan über die
Politik der federalen Regierung zu Unruhen,
die sich bis 1974 hinzogen. Die Balochen
fühlten sich damals wie um die Reichtümer
ihres Landes betrogen. Sezessionistische
Forderungen waren an der Tagesordnung.
Der damalige Premierminister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto sah sich genötigt, die Regierung in
Quetta abzusetzen und, wie vor drei Jahren
beispielsweise Musharraf, die Armee zur
Beruhigung der Lage einzusetzen. Der
Schah von Persien half damals mit der Ent-
sendung von Hubschraubern und Piloten,
er fürchtete ein Übergreifen der Rebellion
auf die von Balochen bewohnten Landes-
teile im Osten seines Reiches. Folgerichtig
kam es hier denn auch zu einer ersten Zu-
sammenarbeit zwischen dem pakistani-
schen Geheimdienst ISI und dem iranischen
SAVAK. Von Seiten Afghanistans aber kam
Hilfe für die rebellierenden Stämme, hier
war Kabuls Geheimdienst KHAD großzügig
tätig. Nach der Niederschlagung des Auf-
standes ging der gesamte Tribe der Marris,
deren Führung sich zu sozialistischen Pa-
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rolen und Zielen bekannte, für fast 20 Jahre
ins Exil nach Afghanistan. Ein Teil von ih-
nen wurde dort von KHAD zu Untergrund-
kämpfern ausgebildet und verübte in den
70er und 80er-Jahren Sabotageakte in Pa-
kistan, vornehmlich in ihrer alten Heimat
Balochistan, wobei Gas- und Elektrizitäts-
leitungen und -stationen bevorzugte Ziele
waren. Der Marri-Tribe kehrte aufgrund
einer Amnestie erst 1991 nach Balochistan
zurück. Ihrer alten Siedlungsräume verlus-
tig, hausen sie bis heute in Lagern in der
Umgebung von Quetta.
Auch Murtaza Bhutto, der nach dem Hän-
gen seines Vaters die Terrororganisation Al
Murtaza gründet hatte, ging für einige Zeit
nach Afghanistan, wo ihm und seinen Leu-
ten Unterschlupf und Hilfe gewährt wurde.
Al Murtaza machte danach mit Attentaten
und blutigen Flugzeugenführungen von sich
reden, in den 80er-Jahren verfehlte ein
Kommando zweimal nur knapp das Ziel
eines erfolgreichen Attentats auf den da-
maligen Präsidenten Zia-ul-Haq. Da sich in
Afghanistan KGB und KHAD der Exil-
Belutschen angenommen hatten, sah man
sich in Pakistan unter Zugzwang. Mit dem
Ziel, afghanischen Unruhestiftern unter den
Paschtunen im Grenzland zuvorzukommen,
stellte der ISI auf Anweisung von Bhutto
eine 5.000 Mann starke afghanische Gue-
rillatruppe auf, die in Nordwestprovinz
(NWFP) ausgebildet wurde. Unter ihren
ersten Absolventen waren Leute wie Hek-
matyar, Rabbani und Masood, deren Namen
in den 90er-Jahren weltweit bekannt wurden.
Als Folge der Ereignisse in Belutschistan
wurde 1973 im ISI zudem ein "Special
Operation Bureau" geschaffen, das zur
Wiege des legendären Afghanistan Bu-
reau’s der 80er-Jahre werden sollte. Chef
dieses Büros war Colonel Syed Raza Ali,
der über seinen Auftrag schrieb: "Ich sollte
eine Organisation aufbauen und leiten, die
gebraucht wurde, um die Regierung über
die vielfältigen Facetten der Bekämpfung
von Aufständen in Pakistan, die ausgemerzt
werden mussten, zu beraten und die Akti-
vitäten von unterschiedlichen Stellen der
Staatsmacht zu koordinieren. So fing alles
an. Die erste Phase des Krieges in Afgha-
nistan hatte begonnen."
Genauer gesagt, die Zeit der ISI-Aktionen im
Nachbarland Afghanistan hatte begonnen.
Eine erste große Operation war 1975 die Ini-
tiierung eines Aufstandes im Pansheer-Tal,
der zwar fehlschlug, Kabul aber zu der Er-
kenntnis verhalf, die pakistanische Karte
nicht zu überreizen. Raza Ali berichtet, wie
der ISI auf Leute wie Hekmatyar, Rabbani,
Khalis und Masood aufmerksam geworden
war und diese für seine Zwecke nutzte:
"Diese Individuen hatten einen gewissen
Einfluss auf verschiedene Kollegs und Uni-
versitäten in Afghanistan, besonders in Ka-
bul. Ihre konservativ-religiöse Orientierung
und ihre Opposition zur kommunistischen
Herrschaft hatte sie in einen Konflikt mit der
Regierung gebracht … Sie überquerten re-
gelmäßig die Grenze von und nach Afgha-
nistan, wo sie einen Aufstand organisierten,
der im Pasheer-Tal stattfand. Dieses Ereignis
weckte Daud aus seinem Schlummer, ließ
ihn umgänglicher werden und den Ernst der
Lage erkennen. Er begann, sein Verhältnis
zu Pakistan zu verbessern. Von da an rück-
ten die Realpolitik und die Diplomatie in
den Vordergrund. Daud ließ sich dazu her-
ab, sich mit dem Thema der Durand-Linie
zu beschäftigen und damit aufzuhören, Ter-
roristen über die pakistanisch-afghanische
Grenze nach Pakistan zu infiltrieren."
In der Folge kam es zu Kontakten zwischen
den Regierungen beider Länder, PM Bhutto
legte einmal auf einer Auslandsreise einen
kurzen Zwischenstopp in Kabul ein und traf
sich mit dem afghanischen PM Daud. Es
wurde ein Treffen beider in Pakistan ver-
einbart, wo alle bilateralen Probleme be-
sprochen und gelöst werden sollten. Das
Treffen kam nie zustande, Daud wurde
1978 von kommunistisch-linksgerichteten
Offizieren ermordet und Bhutto bekanntlich
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als Regierungschef 1977 von Zia gestürzt,
der ihn inhaftieren, verurteilen und hängen
ließ. Das Problem der seit 1893 existenten
Durand-Line blieb somit ungelöst.
2. Die 80er-Jahre
Der Einmarsch sowjetischer Truppen im
Dezember 1979 eröffnete ein neues Kapitel
in den afghanisch-pakistanischen Bezie-
hungen. Die ersten Reaktionen hierauf in
Rawalpindi waren Beklemmung bis Furcht.
Lassen wir hier noch einmal den ISI-
Brigadier Raza Ali zu Worte kommen:
"Irgendwann in der ersten Januarhälfte 1980
wurde eine Konferenz auf höchster Ebene
abgehalten, um die Lage, die durch die
sowjetische Invasion entstanden war, ge-
nauer zu betrachten … Der Präsident (auch
der COAS) und der Außenminister und
jeder, der zählte, nahmen daran teil … Der
erste Redner sagte, dass die Sowjets ge-
kommen waren, um zu bleiben. Sie sind
eine Supermacht, sie haben noch nie ein
Land verlassen, das sie besetzt haben. Es ist
nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis sie an unserer
Grenze sein werden, sagte ein anderer Red-
ner … und so ging die Debatte immer wei-
ter … Die Sowjets werden sich mit ihren
Panzern einfach einen Weg bahnen. Die
zerlumpten Gruppen von schlecht ausge-
rüsteten, unorganisierten Banden der afgha-
nischen Mudschaheddin mit schlechter Dis-
ziplin werden der sowjetischen Besatzung
keinen Widerstand leisten können. Das
Spiel ist aus. Wir müssen unsere Politik in
Hinsicht auf Afghanistan neu konzipieren,
sagte einer der Redner, auf den andere mit
ähnlichen Botschaften folgten."
Präsident Zia-ul-Haq und sein damaliger
ISI-Chef Generalleutnant Akhtar Rahmen
aber hatten den neuen Stellenwert, den Pa-
kistan in den Augen der strategischen Pla-
ner in Washington nun hatte, schnell er-
kannt. Es begann die heute in großen Zügen
bekannte Kooperation zwischen CIA und
ISI im Spiel um Afghanistan der 80er-Jahre.
Hier nur einige Eckdaten:
Die USA und Saudi-Arabien zahlten jeweils
ca. 2,5 Milliarden US$, hinzu kamen noch
einmal etliche Hundert Millionen Dollar als
Spenden privater Geber aus der islamischen
Welt. Insgesamt wurden so für den Kampf
in Afghanistan in den 80er-Jahren rd.
6 Mrd. US$ aufgebracht. Der ISI nahm da-
bei die Rolle eines "sole agents" im Ver-
hältnis zu den Mudschaheddin ein und es
versteht sich von selbst, dass dabei ein Teil
des Geldes bereits in Pakistan hängen blieb.
Immerhin, am Ende der 80er-Jahre waren
die sowjetischen Truppen geschlagen und
aus Afghanistan abgezogen, eine illustre
Liste pakistanischer Militärs hatte schmu-
cke Häuser und gepolsterte Bankkonten
daheim wie im Ausland, und der ISI war
von einem relativ kleinen und schlecht aus-
gerüsteten Geheimdienst zu einem der ef-
fektivsten und besten Nachrichtendienste
zumindest in Asien geworden. Und das
Selbstbewusstsein pakistanischer Militärs
und Politiker wie auch der afghanischen
Mudschaheddin-Führer war gewaltig ge-
stiegen, geboren war die Überzeugung der
"we are second to no one" und der bis heute
existierende Glaube, dass man primär der-
jenige war, der die Supermacht Sowjetuni-
on zum Zusammenbruch gebracht hatte.
Geerbt hatte Pakistan im Zusammenhang
mit dem Afghanistan-Unternehmen der
80er-Jahre aber auch ein Problem, das bis
heute weiter existiert. Das Land hat heute
ca. 4,6 Millionen Drogenabhängige. Die
Führer der zerlumpten, schlecht ausgerüs-
teten und unorganisierten Gruppen der Mu-
dschaheddin waren zu einem Großteil zu
gut organisierten Drogendealern geworden,
die sie, so weit sie noch leben, bis heute
noch sind. Neben ihnen gibt es heute weite-
re mächtige afghanische wie pakistanische
Drogenhändler und andere, die am Drogen-
fluss finanziell mit verdienen. Afghanistan
produziert heute über 4.000 Tonnen Opium
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im Jahr, das in Afghanistan selbst, in Pa-
kistan und in der Türkei vorwiegend zu He-
roin verarbeitet wird und danach den Weg
weiter nach Westen findet. Die Hauptwege
dieses Drogenflusses führen bis heute von
Afghanistan entweder direkt über den Iran
in die Türkei oder aber über pakistanisches
Territorium, über seine Flugplätze, Häfen
und die Makran-Küste nach dorthin.
Geblieben ist Pakistan aber auch ein, wenn
man so will, "positiver" Aspekt, es existiert
eine auf Schwarzgeld basierende Schatten-
Ökonomie, die nach Meinung internationa-
ler Experten zumindest genauso bedeutend
wie die offizielle Wirtschaft und ein we-
sentlicher Grund dafür ist, dass das Land in
der Vergangenheit trotz zeitweiliger Zah-
lungsunfähigkeit wirtschaftlich nicht zu-
sammenbrach. Verschiedene pakistanische
Regierungen brachten denn auch Verord-
nungen und Gesetze "as good economic
measures to boost economic progress" auf
den Weg, die den Zufluss von Schwarzgeld
und damit auch das Reinwaschen von Dro-
gengeldern erleichterten. Und ein Financial
Bill von 2008, angenommen vom Parlament
(NA) am 22. Juni 2008, ermöglicht das He-
reinbringen von Geld ohne jedwede Nach-
prüfung seiner Herkunft, sofern 2% Abgabe
an das Government bezahlt werden.
Großteilen der Welt, vornehmlich des
Westens, ist zudem ein Erbe aus dem
Afghanistan-Unternehmen der 80er-Jahre
geblieben, das bis heute weiterlebt und
Wirkungen entfaltet. Rund 60.000 Jehadis,
vornehmlich aus arabischen Ländern, aber
auch aus anderen Teilen der islamischen
Welt kommend, waren in Camps in Af-
ghanistan und Pakistan ausgebildet wor-
den. Afghanistan wurde so, und das gilt bis
heute, zum "… largest consumer and in-
deed laboratory for Pakistan’s jihad factory.
Afghanistan also provided inspiration to
the radical Islamists and enabled them to
refine the tactics of their deadly trade and
then replicate the experience in battle-
grounds around the world." 1
3. Die 90er-Jahre und die
Situation bis heute
Wenn man die internationale Berichterstat-
tung über Afghanistan ab Mitte der 90er-
Jahre liest, wird man immer wieder auf die
Aussage stoßen, die dort ab April 1994 in
Erscheinung getretenen Taliban seien ein
Geschöpf des pakistanischen Geheimdien-
stes "Inter Services Intelligence" gewesen.
Diese Behauptung ist falsch, in Wirklichkeit
war man im ISI-Hauptquartier am Aabpara
Markt in Islamabad bis zum Herbst 1994
bzgl. des Kampfwertes der Taliban und
damit deren Nützlichkeit für Pakistan eher
skeptisch. Eine Mehrheit der im ISI mit
Afghanistan beschäftigten Offiziere favori-
sierte 1994 eine weitere Zusammenarbeit
mit Gulbadin Hekmatyar und seiner "Hezb-
e-Islami", mit denen man in den 80er-Jah-
ren in Afghanistan so erfolgreich gegen die
Armee Moskaus gekämpft hatte.
Erst Ende 1994 kam es zu ersten offiziellen
Kontakten zwischen den Taliban und dem
ISI, nachdem die neuen Gotteskrieger am
3. November 1994 in die strategisch wichti-
ge südafghanische Stadt Kandahar einmar-
schiert waren. Im ISI begann ein Umdenken
in Richtung einer Abkehr von Hekmatyar und
einer künftigen Kooperation mit den Tali-
ban. Im November 1994 kam eine Taliban
Delegation erstmals zum ISI nach Islam-
abad, geführt von Mulla Rabani, der damali-
gen Nummer 2 der Taliban und deren späte-
ren Außenminister. In der Erinnerung des
damaligen ISI Chefs Generalleutnant Javed
Ashraf Qazi, der später unter Musharraf
Pakistans Minister für Bildung war, lautete
der Tenor der ersten Taliban-Bitten an den
ISI wie folgt: "Don’t help the Mujahedeen
Commanders anymore, stay out, be neutral.
We don’t want weapon or money from you,
but don’t stop food and oil supply to us
which we will pay with our own money."
Nun wurden die Grundlagen einer künftigen
Zusammenarbeit besprochen und ab Beginn
1995 wurde der ISI zum mächtigen Mentor
der afghanischen Taliban, eine Partnerschaft,
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die erst in der Folge der Ereignisse vom
11. September ein dramatisches Ende fand.
Wenn somit der ISI nicht der Vater der
Taliban war, stellt sich die Frage, wer der
wirkliche Geburtshelfer war. Tatsächlich
war es die von 1993 bis 1996 im Amt be-
findliche zweite Regierung von Benazir
Bhutto, die aus wirtschafts-strategischen
Gründen sichere Transportwege nach Zen-
tralasien und Westchina suchte und dabei die
Taliban schuf. In Zentralasien sah und sieht
Islamabad bis heute für sich ein großes
Handelspotenzial, dort sah man Öl, Gas,
Erze, Baumwolle etc. Hier erhofft man für
sich einen Markt und für seine Kaufleute
und Ingenieure neue Tätigkeitsfelder. Pa-
kistan offeriert den zentralasiatischen Staa-
ten und China die kürzesten Routen zu den
blauen Wassern des Roten Meeres und des
Indischen Ozeans. Das Problem ist nur, dass
diese Wege immer über Afghanistan füh-
ren. Eine nördliche Route führt von Pesha-
war über Kabul, den Hindukush (Salang
Tunnel), Mazar-e-Sharif nach Tirmez und
Taschkent in Usbekistan. Eine südliche
Route von Quetta über Kandahar und Herat
nach Ashkabat in Turkmenistan. Zwar gibt
es, von China in den 60er-Jahren gebaut,
mit dem Karakorum Highway auch eine
direkte Verbindung zwischen China und
Pakistan über den 4960 m hoch gelegenen
Kunjerab-Pass, der zur alten Seidenstraßen-
Stadt Kashgar führt, diese Hochgebirgs-
straße allein aber ist unzureichend. Ihre
wirtschaftliche Tragfähigkeit ist begrenzt,
zudem ist sie im Kriegsfall leicht zu blo-
ckieren. Daher also das Interesse Pakistans
und auch Chinas, siehe den Neubau des
Tiefseehafens Gwadar in Balochistan, an
den über Afghanistan führenden Routen.
Ein zweiter Grund für Pakistans Engage-
ment im Nachbarland Afghanistan ist das
Wunschdenken seiner Militärs nach strate-
gischer Tiefe. Als im Jahre 1991 der dama-
lige Armeechef General Aslam Beg vor
dem National Defence College, der Militär-
universität des Landes, sein Projekt "strate-
gic depth" vorstellte, erhielt er von den an-
wesenden Offizieren lang andauernden Bei-
fall. Pakistan fürchtet, in einem Krieg mit
Indien nicht genügend tiefen Ausweich-
und Rückzugsraum zu haben und sucht die-
sen in einer Allianz mit Afghanistan und
möglichst auch dem Iran. Hier wird auch
deutlich, warum man in Pakistan seit dem
Abzug der Armee Moskaus darauf drängt,
an der Spitze Afghanistans wieder Paschtu-
nen zu sehen, mit denen man solche Pläne
leichter zu verwirklichen glaubt. Experten
halten dies allerdings für einen Irrglauben,
da viele Paschtunen eher an ein Groß-
Pastunistan glauben als an eine künftige
staatliche Einheit Pakistans.
Im Übrigen steht Pakistan mit seinen stra-
tegischen Interessen beim Nachbarn nicht
allein. Hamid Karzai verschweigt das Tun
anderer Mitspieler, wenn er sich über die
Einmischung Islamabads in die inneren
Angelegenheiten seines Landes beklagt. Als
solche weiteren Mitspieler wären neben
den USA auch der Iran, Russland, Saudi-
Arabien, China und Indien zu nennen. Die
Absichten der USA sind deutlich, sie wol-
len von Afghanistan aus den Iran isolieren,
Pakistan an seiner Westgrenze beobachten
und kontrollieren, über Afghanistan für
sich selbst Zugang nach Zentralasien haben
und Russland und China den Zugang nach
Afghanistan und Pakistan erschweren.
Der Iran
Der Iran will die amerikanische Umklam-
merung aufbrechen, will den Abzug der
USA aus Afghanistan, dem Irak und aus
dem ganzen Mittleren Osten. Alle Möglich-
keiten, die Pläne der USA zu torpedieren,
werden in Verfolgung dieser Ziele von
Teheran genutzt. Ergo mischt der Iran ver-
deckt auch in Afghanistan weiter mit. In
Abkehr seiner Politik der 90er-Jahre, als er
Ahmed Shah Masood gegen die Taliban
von Mullah Omar unterstützte, lieferte Te-
heran verdeckt ab 2003 Waffen an die neu-
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en Taliban. Der Iran bietet sich zudem mit
seinen bereits voll ausgebauten Straßen-
und Eisenbahnverbindungen, seinen Pipe-
lines und Tiefwasser-Häfen auch als wirt-
schaftliches Transitland mit Wegen an, die
kaum länger sind als die pakistanischen
Routen. Der Iran steht damit auch in wirt-
schaftlicher Konkurrenz zu Pakistan. Zu-
dem ist der Iran bemüht, in Kabul keine von
Paschtunen dominierte Regierung zum Zu-
ge kommen zu lassen. Über eine dortige
Regierung, die proportional gerecht alle
Volksteile umfasst, will er den eigenen
kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Einfluss in
Afghanistan, zumindest aber in Herat und
den Provinzen im Westen des Landes,
schützen und erhalten.
Russland
Russland ist derzeit erfolgreich dabei, in
seinem Hinterhof Zentralasien verlorenen
Boden zurückzugewinnen und die Ameri-
kaner von dort wieder hinaus zu drängen.
Diese Pläne schließen den amerikanischen
Abzug aus Afghanistan ein, ergo spielt
Moskau verdeckt weiterhin dort in nicht
unbeträchtlichem Maße weiter mit. Es wa-
ren russische Schmuggler, die als Erste ab
2003 neue Waffen nach Afghanistan brach-
ten. Moskau hat im Land am Hindukush
nicht unbeträchtliche wirtschaftliche Interes-
sen. Es war immer bemüht, geplante Gas-
und Ölpipelines von Zentralasien über Af-
ghanistan und Pakistan zur Arabischen See
zu verhindern. Sollten diese Pipelines künf-
tig dennoch zustande kommen, ist von dem
Bemühen Moskaus auszugehen, an entspre-
chenden Kuratorien zumindest beteiligt zu
sein, um so Einfluss zu haben und mitzu-
verdienen.
China
China hat in Afghanistan neben seinem schon
erwähnten Suchen nach sicheren Routen
von Westchina zum Indischen Ozean auch
das Interesse, das Land nicht wieder zum
Ausbildungs- und Ruheraum uighurischer
Rebellen werden zu lassen. Peking hat aber
auch enorme wirtschaftliche Interessen in
Afghanistan selbst. Dort gibt es Uranerze,
an denen es interessiert ist. Im "Jalrez-Tal in
Sana", nur 100 km südlich von Kabul gele-
gen und heute als ein von Taliban kontrol-
liertes Gebiet geltend, befinden sich bei
"Aynak" mit 240 Millionen Tonnen zudem
die nach heutigen Erkenntnissen zweit-
größten Kupfererzlager der Welt. Der Be-
darf an Kupfer wird steigen, für Experten
ist der Zeitpunkt absehbar, an dem Kupfer
weltweit zur Mangelware wird. Für die
Lagerstätten bei Aynak hat vor einigen
Monaten die Staatsfirma "China Metallur-
gical Construction Corp." gegen sechsfache
Konkurrenz, darunter die amerikanische
"Phelps Doge Corp.", die Ausbeutungs-
rechte bekommen, ein weiterer Fakt für das
Interesse und Engagement Pekings an Af-
ghanistan. Wir haben somit heute hier die
etwas absonderliche Situation, dass NATO-
Truppen in Afghanistan unter hohen Kosten
auch zur Absicherung chinesischer Wirt-
schaftsinteressen beitragen und Peking hier-
für dem Westen später kaum einen Bonus
einräumen wird.
Indien
Was Indiens Rolle in Afghanistan betrifft,
gibt es in Pakistan unter Militärs und Poli-
tikern, unter Professoren, Studenten und
Journalisten eine regelrechte Phobie. Die
Militärs glauben, Indien habe mit 5.000
vornehmlich als Bauarbeiter getarnten
Männern bereits das Skelett einer ganzen
Division im Norden Afghanistans statio-
niert. Es sei in der Lage, diese Anzahl
schnell auf 50.000 Mann, d.h. auf Stärke
eines Korps, zu erhöhen. Die Politiker spre-
chen von 4.000 Spionen, die als Ärzte Inge-
nieure, Wissenschaftler und Unternehmer
getarnt seien. Die Anzahl der vier indischen
Konsulate im Lande wird als ungerechtfer-
tigt gesehen, sie seien mit Angehörigen von
R&AW überbesetzt und in Wirklichkeit
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Ausgangspunkte für den von Indien unter-
stützten Untergrundkampf einer sog. "Balo-
chistan Liberation Army" in Balochistan.
Tatsächlich ist es Neu-Delhi nach dem
11. September gelungen, seine aus der Zeit
des Kalten Krieges stammenden guten Be-
ziehungen zu Kabul wieder aufzunehmen.
Es hat beträchtliche Hilfs- und Wiederauf-
bauleistungen erbracht, über 100 Omnibusse
geliefert sowie Straßen und Hospitäler ge-
baut. Dies geschieht mit Sicherheit nicht nur
in edler Art und Weise, denn Indien verfährt
nach dem Motto, der Feind meines Feindes
ist mein Freund. In Neu-Delhi konnte man
durchaus hören, Islamabad sorgt für Unru-
hen an unserer Nordgrenze, sprich Kaschmir,
also kümmern wir uns um Pakistans West-
grenze.
Saudi-Arabien
Auch Saudi-Arabien gehört zu den Spielern
im heutigen "great game" um Afghanistan.
Ein nicht unbeträchtlicher Teil der heute in
Afghanistan kämpfenden Taliban kommt
aus Saudi-Arabien. Dabei kann es Riad
nicht nur um die Unterstützung der dortigen
wahabitischen Glaubensbrüder gehen. Es ist
auch darum bemüht, an seinen Grenzen
keine unfreundlichen Nachbarn zu haben.
Hier sei zudem der pikante Hinweis gestat-
tet, dass es in Saudi-Arabien 100 km nörd-
lich und 500 km südlich von Riad moderne
Raketensilos und Abschussanlagen gibt, in
denen heute Raketen neuester pakistanischer
Bauart lagern. Die Bestückung solcher
Raketen mit konventionellen Sprengköpfen
macht wenig Sinn. Ergo kann von einer
engen Kooperation zwischen Pakistan und
Saudi-Arabien auch in Afghanistan ausge-
gangen werden. Man kann zudem von sau-
dischen Wirtschaftsinteressen in Afghanis-
tan ausgehen. Sollten einst Pipelines von
Turkmenistan zur Arabischen See gebaut
werden, dürfte Riad, wie im Übrigen auch
Moskau, darum bemüht sein, den entspre-
chenden Konsortien anzugehören.
Pakistan
Was Pakistans Interessen in Afghanistan an-
geht, wird es weiterhin danach trachten, in
Kabul eine gegenüber Pakistan kooperative,
mehrheitlich von Paschtunen geführte Regie-
rung im Sattel zu wissen. Im Hintergrund
stehen dabei die bereits dargelegten Interes-
sen des Landes nach sicheren Durchgangs-
routen von und nach Zentralasien, von denen
es sich große wirtschaftliche Impulse ver-
spricht. Zudem ist das Streben der Militärs
nach "strategic depth" weiterhin existent.
Pakistan will, und wer kann es ihm verden-
ken, im Westen eine sichere, anerkannte
Grenze haben. Auch wenn die Präsidenten
Hamid Karzai und Asif Zardari kürzlich
in Washington einträchtig neben dem US-
Präsidenten Obama standen, das Verhältnis
zwischen ihren beiden Ländern wird noch
lange von Misstrauen geprägt sein. Nichts
zeigt das deutlicher als der Umstand, dass
von einem zwischen Karzai und Zardari in
Washington unterzeichneten Memorandum,
das Indien einen Wirtschaftskorridor von der
Wagha-Grenzstation bei Lahore über den
Khyber-Pass nach Afghanistan einräumt,
inzwischen nichts weiter zu hören ist. Hier
dürften die Militärs ihre Bedenken angemel-
det und auf die Bremse getreten haben. In
Pakistan ging man seit April 2009 davon
aus, dass Hamid Karzai mangels personellen
Alternativen eine weitere Amtszeit als Präsi-
dent Afghanistans vor sich haben wird. Man
weiß, dass Karzai gegenüber Indien freund-
lichere Gefühle hegt als gegenüber Pakistan.
Die Militärs in den Hauptquartieren von
Armee und ISI werden daher die Afghanis-
tan-Politik ihrer Regierung weiterhin genau
beobachten und notfalls ihr Veto anmelden.
In den Musharraf-Jahren hatten afghanische
Taliban (Mullah Omar und Shura) und die
zu al-Qaeda gehörenden, aus verschiedenen
Ländern stammenden islamistischen Kämp-
fer Schlupfwinkel vornehmlich in Balo-
chistan und FATA gefunden. Ihre pakista-
nischen Gesinnungsgenossen und ISI-Leute
halfen ihnen, sich neu zu formieren und
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auszurüsten. Zusammen mit pakistanischen
Taliban und Jehadis sickerten sie dann wie-
der nach Afghanistan ein und trugen zu-
sammen mit dortigen militanten Gruppen
zur zunehmend fragiler werdenden Sicher-
heitslage bei. Die an der Grenze postierten
100.000 pakistanischen Soldaten schauten
dabei weisungsgemäß weg. Das Musharraf-
Regime betrieb so ein Doppelspiel. Es nahm
zum einen am internationalen Kampf gegen
den Terror teil, wo es sowohl Erfolge errang
wie selbst Opfer trug. Zugleich aber trug es
zur Instabilität im Nachbarland bei und ver-
suchte so seine strategischen Interessen zu
schützen. Auch heute sind ein Teil der Mili-
tanten in Afghanistan Ausländer. Nach
Mullah Mehmoud, einem Taliban-Comman-
der im Golestan-Distrikt in der Helmand-
Provinz, sollen es 60% sein, wobei die
meisten aus Saudi-Arabien und der pakista-
nischen Provinz Punjab kommen sollen.2
An dieser Stelle sei der Hinweis gestattet,
dass die im Westen verbreitete Vorstellung,
nach der die Madressen (Islamic Seminaries)
des Landes die Hauptgeburtsstätten der pa-
kistanischen Jihadi-Kultur seien, nicht rich-
tig ist. Einige bekannte Madressen spielen
ohne Zweifel hierbei eine Rolle, die über-
wiegende Zahl der Jehadis aber kommt, wie
eine Studie des Sustainable Development
Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad zeigt,
aus dem Punjab. Und das in Karachi er-
scheinende politische Monatsmagazin He-
rald schrieb: "It is a fact of life that for every
militant thrown out by a madrassa, there are
dozens who never went anywhere near a
religious seminary. Instead, they were just
plain criminals before they chose to elevate
themselves to the status of jihadis. Talking
of a crackdown on madrassas may make
eminent sense to the West but it offers very
little in terms of actually getting a handle on
the problem".3
In Pakistan unterschätzten die Generäle über
die letzten Jahre zwei Dinge. Zum einen
den zunehmenden Herrschaftsanspruch der
islamischen Militanten in Pakistan selbst.
Bei einer Lagebeurteilung im Frühjahr 2009
mussten sie feststellen, dass die Regierung
nur noch 38% und die Taliban bereits 24%
von NWFP kontrollierten. In weiteren 24%
von NWFP waren die Taliban zumindest
permanent anwesend. Noch schlimmer aber
war, dass sich für 47% von Punjab die Ge-
fahr höherer Aktivitäten der Taliban ab-
zeichnete. Bei den Generälen setzte sich
daher die Einsicht durch, dass die Taliban
die Grenze des aus taktischen und strategi-
schen Gründen bisher Tolerierten über-
schritten hatten und man zeigen musste, wer
Herr im Hause ist. Zum anderen wurde im
GHQ wie beim ISI der Wille der USA un-
terschätzt, in Afghanistan nicht ein ähnli-
ches Debakel hinnehmen zu müssen, wie es
Moskau beschieden gewesen war.
Das Ergebnis ist das gegenwärtige Vorge-
hen pakistanischer Militärs in Swat, in an-
deren Teilen von NWFP und in FATA. Der
Ausgang dieser Unternehmen ist noch un-
gewiss. Fraglich ist weiterhin, ob die Strate-
gen in Rawalpindi und Islamabad ihre bis-
herige Afghanistanpolitik in wesentlichen
Zügen ändern werden und ob in Kabul ein
in seinem Amt bestätigter Hamid Karzai
und seine neue Regierung ein entspanntes
und kooperatives Verhältnis zum Nachbarn
Pakistan finden werden. Im April 2009 kam
eine afghanisch-pakistanische, aus Parla-
mentariern und politischen Spitzenbeamten
bestehende Besuchergruppe auf Einladung
des Auswärtigen Amtes nach Berlin. In ih-
ren Ausführungen sprachen Afghanen wie
Pakistaner mehrfach von einer stattfinden-
den neuen Annäherung zwischen beiden
Staaten. Bleibt abzuwarten, ob diesen
Worten Taten folgen werden.
Anmerkungen
1 Sushant, Sareen: The Jihad Factory, New Delhi
2005.
2 Siehe Daily Times, 15.6.2009.
3 Siehe Herald, Oktober 2003.
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1. Introduction
There are three distinct factors which have a
significant influence on stability and security
in South Asia. The first concerns relations
between external major powers and South
Asian regional powers. During the Cold War,
the Soviet Union supported India, and the
United States and China supported Pakistan.
Both sides were engaged in a struggle
against each other. Since the end of the Cold
War, major powers including China and the
US have shared some common interests in
the security field of South Asia. They would
like to see peace and stability in the region.
It is not in their national interests to use
one country against another in South Asia.
Neither is it in their national interests to
struggle against each other for their strate-
gic position in South Asia. However, some
politicians in the US still want to use India
to balance China.
The second factor concerns relations be-
tween India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan
fought three wars against each other during
the Cold War period. In May 1998, both
conducted nuclear tests. Since 2005 relations
between India and Pakistan have improved
to some extent, and this has helped to reduce
the possibility of armed conflict, including
nuclear exchanges, between the two coun-
tries.
The third factor relates to non-governmental
organizations. In South Asia, especially in
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the terrorist
organization Al-Qaida and extremist groups
such as the Taliban have become a serious
threat to national governments. Other non-
governmental entities such as warlords in
Afghanistan have also had a serious negative
impact on national governments.
2. The China-India security
relationship
The China-India security relationship has
gone through three major phases: friendship
(from 1949 to the end of the 1950s); oppo-
sition (from the early 1960s to the late
1990s) whereby the progress made between
India and China since 1988 was marred by
tension again between the two sides caused
by India's nuclear tests in May 1998. And
finally, strategic partnership from 2005 on-
wards.
Since the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji
visited India in January 2002 and subse-
quently Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bi-
hari Vajpayee visited China in June 2003,
both countries have made considerable pro-
gress in their political, economic and secu-
rity relations. After experiences akin to a
long and winding road, China-India rela-
tions have entered a new stage characterized
by maturity. Both China and India are the
largest developing countries, and their total
population is one-third of the world's popu-
lation. In order for the two countries to ac-
complish their economic and social sustain-
able development it is therefore critically
important to maintain peace, stability and
prosperity in Asia as well as in the world.
At the same time, both countries are rising
powers in international affairs and each
other's neighbours of considerable size, so
they are obliged to view China-India rela-
tions from a strategic perspective and to
make every effort to establish a mutually
constructive and cooperative long-term re-
lationship. Both China and India have civi-
lizations of long standing and a unique his-
tory of their own. The two countries are
peace-loving and their friendly exchanges
go back to ancient times. Furthermore, both
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countries are initiators of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence and share the same
major objectives of realizing their economic
and social modernization. So they are able
to overcome the difficulties and obstacles in
their relationship. During the visits of Chi-
nese Premier Zhu Rongji to India in 2002
and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to
China in 2003, both countries agreed to
strengthen their "long-term constructive
partnership", an objective which was put
forward by the leaders of the two countries
during the visit of Chinese President Jiang
Zemin to India in 1996.
During the visit to India by Chinese Premier
Wen Jibao in April 2005, both countries
agreed to develop their cooperative partner-
ship into a strategic cooperative partnership.
Development of trade and diplomatic links
between the two nations is in the interests of
both, and contributes to regional and world
peace and stability. During the visit, the two
governments inked an agreement on the
political guiding principles to solve the bor-
der issue. This was the first political docu-
ment to be signed by the two countries since
1981 when both countries had started nego-
tiations to settle border disputes. According
to the agreement, "the differences on the
boundary question should not be allowed to
affect the overall development of bilateral
relations" and "the two sides will resolve
the boundary question through peaceful and
friendly consultations. Neither side shall use
or threaten to use force against the other by
any means". India and China will "make
meaningful and mutually acceptable adjust-
ments to their respective positions on the
boundary question, so as to arrive at a pack-
age settlement to the boundary question".
Furthermore, "the boundary settlement must
be final, covering all sectors of the China-
India boundary". Bilateral "strategic and rea-
sonable interests, and the principle of mutual
and equal security" will be kept in mind
while arriving at a final settlement. The
Sino-Indian border has remained tranquil
with no confrontation since 1993.
3. China's new policy towards
neighbouring countries
There is a new aspect in China's current for-
eign strategy and security policy. Among
others, it includes the concept of a period of
important strategic opportunity, and safe-
guarding the common interests of all man-
kind. The foreign strategy and security pol-
icy pursued by the new Chinese leadership
can be analyzed according to the theories of
international relations, including interde-
pendence theory, international regime the-
ory, geo-economic theory, and cooperation
for win-win theory. In fact, China has de-
veloped those theories into a new rationale.
There are internal factors and external
factors affecting China's international role.
With the integration of China into interna-
tional economic and political mechanisms,
China will continue its responsible role as a
major power in international affairs in the
next twenty years.
At present, China has put its relationships
with major powers as the first priority of
its foreign strategy; its relationships with
neighbouring countries as critically impor-
tant to its foreign strategy; and its relation-
ships with developing countries as the
foundation of its foreign strategy. India is a
rising major power in Asia, a neighbouring
country with China, and one of the biggest
developing countries. So China has placed
great importance on its relationship with
India.
The first two decades of the 21st century are
a period of important strategic opportunity
for China. During this period China will
focus its attention on an all-out effort to
build an affluent society. The objectives of
China's modernization programme are to
quadruple the GDP of 2000 by 2020, and to
become a mid-level developed country by
2050. In order to achieve these objectives,
China needs long-term peace and a stable
international security environment which
will further its economic development.
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4. China's new concepts of
foreign strategy
In the 21st century there are the three major
historical tasks for China: to propel the mod-
ernization drive; to achieve national reunifi-
cation; and to safeguard world peace and
promote common development.1 In order to
accomplish the three major historical tasks,
China has some new concepts for its foreign
strategy.
4.1 Safeguarding common interests
Firstly, China recognizes the necessity to go
along with the tide of history and to safe-
guard the common interests of all humanity.
Due to the development of economic glob-
alization, the common interests of all man-
kind have become evident. China is ready to
work with the international community to
boost global multi-polarization, promote the
harmonious coexistence of diverse forces,
and maintain stability in the international
community. China will continue to improve
and develop relations with the developed
countries. Proceeding from the fundamental
interests of all countries concerned, China
will broaden the converging points of com-
mon interests and properly settle differences
on the basis of the Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence, notwithstanding the differ-
ences in social systems and ideologies.
China has been cooperating with the United
States and other countries in anti-terror
projects and in dealing with regional secu-
rity problems, such as the North Korean
nuclear crisis.
4.2 Mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality and coordination
Secondly, China stresses a new concept of
security which features mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality and coordination. Since the
end of the Cold War, China has greatly
changed its security concepts in accordance
with the new international situation and the
interests of the Chinese people as well as
mankind's need to seek peace and develop-
ment. It is China's view that to obtain lasting
peace, it is imperative to abandon the Cold
War mentality, cultivate a new concept of
security and seek a new way to safeguard
peace. China holds that countries should
trust one another, work together to maintain
security and to resolve disputes through dia-
logue and cooperation, and should not resort
to the use or threat of force. It has been
proved that the new concepts of security are
in keeping with current trends and have great
vitality.
China holds that the core of the new security
concept should be mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality and coordination.2 The new
security concept should also be the guideline
to resolve disputes in international security.3
On 7 October 2003, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao stressed: "It is China's existing guide-
line to advance the vigorous development,
peace and stability in Asia. It is an important
part of China's development strategy to
maintain good relationships with neighbours,
make them secure and help them to become
rich".
"To maintain good relationships with neigh-
bours" means that China will carry forward
the Chinese philosophy of "making close and
friendly relations with neighbours", so that
they can cooperatively establish a stable and
harmonious structure of relationships be-
tween China and its neighbours under the
principle of living in harmony with sur-
rounding countries. "To make neighbours
secure" means that China will vigorously
maintain regional peace and stability, and
persist in improving mutual trust through
dialogue and cooperation and in resolving
disputes though peaceful negotiations, so as
to construct a peaceful and stable regional
environment for the development of Asia."
To help neighbours to become rich" means
that China will strengthen cooperation of
mutual benefit with its neighbours, and will
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deepen regional and sub-regional coopera-
tion in order to realize common development
with other Asian countries.
4.3 The China-India strategic
cooperative partnership
Thirdly, China will strengthen the China-In-
dia strategic cooperative partnership through
mutual trust and a win-win concept. The two
countries should look on their mutual rela-
tions from a strategic perspective, and with
long-term views. Both should recognize the
long-term and fundamental common inter-
ests between them. They should continue to
use the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-
tence as the guidelines to guide China-India
relations. The two countries should resolve
their border disputes in a spirit of mutual co-
ordination as well as mutual understanding
and accommodation through negotiations.
The China-India agreement on political
guiding principles on solving the border is-
sue will help the special representatives of
the two governments negotiate territorial
claims as experts delineate the boundary on
a map and on the ground.
The two countries should further strengthen
the dialogue on strategic and security issues
between them. They should further enhance
defense exchanges and confidence-building
measures between the two militaries so as
to improve mutual trust. They should also
increase mutual economic and trade coop-
eration so as to strengthen the foundation of
the China-India relationship.
5. Terrorism as one of the major
 threats to South Asia
Since the end of the Cold War, and espe-
cially since the 9/11 events, the system of
international relations has been undergoing
transformation from one of balance of power
in international anarchy to a new one
mainly characterized by mutual interde-
pendence between countries. This transfor-
mation will go through a long-term transi-
tion period during which there will many
complex struggles, on a path that will be
tortuous. Terrorism has become one of the
major threats to mankind and the interna-
tional community during this transforma-
tion of the international relations system.
5.1 Non-traditional security threats
The impact of non-traditional security threats
on international relations has been rapidly
increasing. Non-traditional security threats
can also be described as global problems,
transnational problems or low politics prob-
lems. They include terrorism, environmental
pollution, global warming, population explo-
sion, drug trafficking, international crime,
HIV/AIDS. Non-traditional security threats
have two major characteristics: they are pre-
sent everywhere in the world and as such
concern all mankind; and they threaten the
existence and development of all human
beings.
Security problems can be transformed into
non-traditional security problems, and non-
traditional security problems can lead to tra-
ditional armed conflicts. Furthermore, tra-
ditional security threats and non-traditional
security threats can be interwoven with each
other and mutate from one to the other. For
example, weapons of mass destruction are
traditional security problems. However, if
terrorists have such weapons, this becomes
a non-traditional security threat and a trans-
national problem. Another example is that
cross-boundary attacks by terrorists are non-
traditional security threats, which may lead
to traditional armed conflicts.
As a result of the large-scale Cold War arms
race between the two superpowers, the
United States and the former Soviet Union;
of long-term exploitation and ignorance to-
wards developing nations by developed na-
tions; and as a result of human greed, non-
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traditional security threats have increased in
recent years and have more and more im-
pact. That has greatly increased the com-
mon interests of all countries in the world,
and made countries more inclined to coop-
erate in order to deal with and resolve those
problems. With the growing impact of non-
traditional security threats on international
relations and the growth of common inter-
ests between countries, it is necessary for
countries, especially the major powers, to
resolve disputes between them through con-
sultation and coordination, and to cooperate
to deal with non-traditional security threats.
5.2 The role of non-state elements
Terrorism as one of the non-state elements
is being increasingly implicated in interna-
tional relations. Non-state actors include ter-
rorist organizations, transnational companies,
non-governmental organizations, multilateral
organizations. In recent years, non-state ac-
tors have become important actors in inter-
national relations. Some non-state actors
now have even the same amount of capital
and means as states do. There are large
transnational companies which have more
capital than medium-sized or small states. In
international society, there are many kinds of
non-governmental organizations which play
a spectacular role in international relations
and international politics. Since the end of
the Cold War, terrorist organizations and
their actions have developed and become the
new threat to human society. The 9/11 inci-
dent is the most glaring example. Although
terrorism has been around for ages, global
terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon.
Transnational and multiethnic, it is interna-
tional in scope, with terrorists representing
all walks of life, poor to rich, third world to
first world, illiterate to educated. Ironically,
the same mechanisms that have fuelled
economic globalization have also enabled
terrorism on a global scale. Those non-state
actors have a very significant impact on in-
ternational relations.
6. Anti-terror war launched by the
United States
In line with the military concept of Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs (RMA), the Ad-
ministration of George W. Bush which as-
sumed power in January 2001 intended to
strengthen the absolute superiority of the
US military, to realize absolute security for
the United States, and to further consolidate
its leadership in the world through making
use of US high-tech military superiority.
The 9/11 incident was the first time since it
had become a superpower that the United
States suffered such a heavy loss from an
external attack on the American mainland.
Under those circumstances, the United
States regarded anti-terrorism as the high-
est priority of its national security strategy
and began the anti-terror war. At the same
time, the Pentagon began to make signifi-
cant readjustments to its defense strategy.
One important characteristic of the read-
justment of US defense strategy is to stress
that the US military should shift from a
"threats-based approach" to a "capabilities-
based" approach. The Pentagon holds that
concept since it reflects the fact that the
United States cannot know with confidence
what nation, combination of nations, or
non-state actor will pose threats to vital US
interests or those of US allies and friends
decades from now. So the Bush Admini-
stration has given up the guideline of
military strategy to "prepare for winning
two major theatre wars" and has asked US
forces to have military capabilities to deal
with different situations in this century. An-
other important characteristic of the read-
justment of US defense strategy is the pro-
posal of the strategic concept of "pre-
emptive attacks". In the Nuclear Posture
Review report presented by the Pentagon in
January 2001, the US Department of De-
fense even holds that nuclear weapons can
be used to attack targets which are able to
sustain attacks by conventional weapons.
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The third important characteristic of the re-
adjustment of US defense strategy is to re-
gard homeland security as the foundation of
US defense strategy. In order to win the war
on terror and to develop future capabilities,
the Pentagon is speeding up the development
of high-tech weapons, including Missile De-
fense, weapons to be used in space, capabili-
ties for persistent surveillance, tracking, and
rapid engagement. However, the new US de-
fense strategy still has a lot of the Cold War
mentality. For example, in the annual de-
fense report to the US President and Con-
gress put forward by US DoD in August
2002, the Pentagon claims that a military
competitor with a significant source base
may appear in Asia in the future. In order to
deal with this, the United States will take
some measures to strengthen its military
presence in East Asia, including among
others deployment of another aircraft car-
rier, and submarines with cruise missiles.
The terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001
marked the beginning of a new era in the
fight against global terrorism. US President
George W. Bush declared war against ter-
rorism, dictating a strategic shift of the US
from diplomatic and police action to war. On
7 October 2001, the United States launched
military attacks against the Taliban and Al-
Qaida in Afghanistan. U.S forces defeated
them, but have still not captured Osama
bin Laden. Al-Qaida remnants still exist.
In 2003, following its 2002 release of the
National Security Strategy, the US pub-
lished the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, National Strategy to Secure Cy-
berspace and National Strategy for Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets, in order to flesh out its new national
security strategy aimed at counter-terrorism,
non-proliferation and homeland security. As
the first step in carrying out the new strat-
egy, the US waged a preemptive war against
Iraq in March 2003 on grounds that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction. With no
WMDs found in Iraq, the US and the UK
had to face increasing suspicions about their
rationale for the war. Although there was a
general election in Iraq in January 2005,
there have been frequent attacks from both
terrorists and anti-American resistance
against both US forces and Iraqi police, of-
ficials and civilians. Many terrorists have
come to Iraq from all over the world and are
using Iraq as their training centre. Further-
more, terrorists also struck Western targets
in Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, Russia, Mo-
rocco, Egypt, Pakistan, London, and so on.
In May 2003, the US launched the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI), expressing its
readiness to carry out sea or air interceptions
with willing allies against ships and aircraft
suspected of transporting nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons and their compo-
nents. PSI received support from Australia,
Japan, the European countries, and some
other countries.
7. China’s policy towards terrorism
and the war on terror
7.1 International cooperation
against terrorism.
China has been actively participating in
international cooperation against terrorism.
During the Anti-terrorism Meeting of For-
eign Ministers of the UN Security Council
held on 20 January 2003, Chinese Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan put forward a four-
point proposal for extending the war on ter-
ror. First, with peace and security for all
mankind as the central theme of counter-
terrorism, efforts should be made to culti-
vate a new security concept featuring mu-
tual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co-
operation and to resolve or mitigate such
regional hotspots as the Middle East and
Iraq. Second, with universal development
and common prosperity as the foundation of
counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to
promote the economic development of all
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countries, to narrow the wealth gap and at-
tain the development goals laid down by the
UN Millennium Summit. Third, with closer
communication among and integration of
different civilizations as the safeguard of
counter-terrorism, efforts should be made
to promote understanding and tolerance
among diverse civilizations and cultures.
Fourth, with stronger exchange and coop-
eration as the key to counter-terrorism, ef-
forts should be made to give scope to the
leading role of the UN and help developing
countries build up their capacity in compli-
ance with the purposes and principles of the
UN Charter.4
7.2 The role of the UN
China has supported the leading role played
by the United Nations and its Security
Council in counter-terrorism and opposing
terrorism in all its forms and manifestation.
China has actively taken part in counter-
terrorism discussions at the UN and its Se-
curity Council. China voted in favour of Se-
curity Council Resolutions 1456, 1465 and
1561 on counter-terrorism, and worked ear-
nestly with the Counter-Terrorism Com-
mittee of the Council.
7.3 Opposition to all forms of terrorism
China opposes all forms of terrorism. China's
position also includes: a comprehensive ap-
proach to address both the symptoms and
root causes of terrorism, enhanced capacity-
building of developing countries against ter-
rorism, and rejection of double standards
and the simplistic practice of linking terror-
ism with specific countries, ethnicities and
religions. China also holds that the fight
against the East Turkistan terrorist forces
was part and parcel of the worldwide cam-
paign against terror, and China stood ready
to step up its cooperation with the relevant
countries on this front in the interest of re-
gional peace and stability.
7.4 Regional cooperation against
terrorism
China has continued to take an active part in
regional or sub-regional cooperation against
terrorism. The Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization has developed into an important
mechanism to promote regional security,
stability and development. In 2003, China
participated in joint military exercises under
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), a move that signifi-
cantly deterred the terrorist forces operating
at home and abroad. In September 2003, the
Foreign Ministers of six member countries
of the SCO signed the Shanghai Convention
on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and
Extremism and the Agreement Between the
SCO Member Countries Concerning the
Regional Counter-Terrorism Agency. In
2003, the Chinese side also participated in
the meeting of the attorney-general and the
first meeting of the Council of the Regional
Counter-Terrorism Agency of the SCO,
playing an important role in guiding and
strengthening the cooperation of the or-
ganization. In January 2004, the SCO Sec-
retariat and the SCO Regional Counter-
Terrorism Agency were formally inaugu-
rated in Beijing and Tashkent respectively.
In June 2004, during the Summit Meeting
of the SCO in Tashkent, leaders of member
countries of the SCO signed the Agreement
on cooperation against the illegal transpor-
tation of narcotic drugs, mind-altering drugs
and their component materials. The SCO
also established a mechanism of regular
meetings of Secretaries of National Security
Councils of member countries, so they can
strengthen their security cooperation.
In September 2004, the Chinese Ambassador
to Portugal Ma Enhan as the representative
of the SCO attended the second meeting of
the OSCE in Lisbon on preventing and com-
bating terrorism. Ambassador Ma briefed the
meeting on the principled positions of the
SCO on preventing and combating terrorism
and the concrete actions it had taken, and ex-
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changed views with the Organization of Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe and other
international organizations on anti-terrorism
cooperation.
7.5 Bilateral cooperation against terrorism
China has continued to deepen bilateral co-
operation against terrorism with the relevant
countries. In 2004, China held the fourth
counter-terrorism consultation with the US
and the third consultation of the China-US
working group on financial anti-terrorism. In
July 2003, the customs authorities of China
and the US signed the bilateral declaration
on the principles of Container Security Ini-
tiatives (CSI) cooperation and the annexes in
Beijing, which opened a new area of China-
US cooperation against terrorism. In addition,
China held the third counter-terrorism
dialogue with India and conducted counter-
terrorism consultation with Germany in 2003.
Following the signing of the Shanghai Con-
vention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism
and Extremism (or the Shanghai Convention
for short) by the Foreign Ministers of six
member countries of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO) in September 2003,
China began to negotiate and conclude bilat-
eral agreements on combating terrorism,
separatism and extremism (or "agreement
against the three forces" for short) with other
member states of SCO in an effort to imple-
ment the Shanghai Convention, build a net-
work of legal cooperation against the three
forces and foster closer cooperation within
the SCO. The China-Tajikistan agreement
against the three forces and that between
China and Uzbekistan were signed on 2 and
4 September 2003 respectively. The Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's
Congress (NPC) of China ratified the China-
Kazakhstan and China-Kyrgyzstan agree-
ments against the three forces on 26 and
27 August 2003 respectively. The agreement
between China and Kazakhstan on the issue
entered into force on 3 July 2003.
In order to help the Afghan people rebuild
the country after the war, China has taken an
active part in Afghanistan's post-war recon-
struction. The Chinese Government seri-
ously honoured its January 2002 pledge of
US$ 150 million aid. During the visit of Af-
ghanistan's Vice-President Nimatullah Shah-
rani to China in May 2003, China announced
its provision of a US$ 15 million grant to
Afghanistan and US$ 1 million cash to the
Afghan Reconstruction Fund. In August
2003, the Chinese side officially handed over
its donation of 80,000 pieces of office appli-
ances to the Afghan Transitional Govern-
ment. By now, the construction of the Chi-
nese-assisted Republic Hospital in Kabul and
the preliminary preparations for the Parwan
Irrigation Project have been completed. In
addition, China made vigorous efforts to
expand its mutually beneficial economic
cooperation and trade with Afghanistan in
telecommunications, building materials,
electrical appliances, and other fields.
China is also helping the Iraqi people recon-
struct the country after the Iraq War. In Oc-
tober 2003, Chinese Assistant Foreign Min-
ister Shen Guofang led a delegation to the
Conference of Donating Countries for Iraqi
Reconstruction held by the United Nations in
Madrid, Spain. During the conference, the
Chinese Government announced that China
would provide US$ 25 million worth of hu-
manitarian aid to Iraq for its reconstruction.
In 2004, the Chinese Government declared
that it would provide training to attorneys
for Iraq.
8. Strengthening international
cooperation against terrorism
8.1 The leading role of the UN
It is important to find a way to facilitate the
leading role of the UN and its Security
Council in the international cooperation
against terrorism. The United Nations has
been playing an important role in the anti-
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terror campaign. Almost all countries
have commended the important role of the
United Nations in coordinating international
counter-terrorism cooperation, and have
spoken highly of the work of the Security
Council Terrorism Committee. Most coun-
tries emphasized that international counter-
terrorism operations must comply with the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter
and other norms of international law, and
efforts should be made to address both
symptoms and root causes of terrorism. On
the definition of terrorism, the Islamic and
non-aligned countries continued to under-
score the justice and legitimacy of national
liberation movements against foreign occu-
pation and to call for sanctions against acts
of state terrorism according to the relevant
conventions and international law.
Under the framework of the UN, the discus-
sions of the Sixth Committee on the Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism, the Draft Convention on the Sup-
pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and
the Convocation of a high-level conference
on preventing and combating terrorism have
been continuing, but have made little prog-
ress. The delegations remained divided on
the major outstanding issues, such as the
definition of terrorism, the scope of applica-
tion of the conventions, the legitimacy of the
use of nuclear weapons by a state, the activi-
ties of armed forces, and the relations be-
tween the comprehensive and sectoral con-
ventions. The Chinese delegation expressed
its support for India's drafting of a Compre-
hensive Convention on International Terror-
ism and Russia's drafting of a Convention on
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror-
ism, and believed that the draft conventions,
once adopted, add to the international legal
framework on counter-terrorism.
8.2 Multilateral cooperation
Multilateral cooperation in the anti-terror
campaign should be enhanced. The common
interests and cooperation between countries
towards non-traditional security threats, in-
cluding terrorism, environmental pollution,
drug trafficking, transnational crimes,
HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and so on, have
been increasing, so that they will seek to re-
solve traditional security problems more
through dialogue and negotiations. The main
objectives of most countries will be the de-
velopment of their economy, society, science
and technology. The mutual interdependence
and cooperation between major powers will
continue to increase, so they will make great
efforts to avoid armed conflicts between
them. The process of establishing and de-
veloping international and regional mecha-
nisms of security cooperation and dialogue
will continue, so that in many regions and
sub-regions, co-existing multi-level, multi-
channel and multi-type mechanisms of se-
curity can be formed. Those international,
regional and sub-regional mechanisms of
security cooperation will become the im-
portant parts of the future system of inter-
national relations mainly characterized by
mutual interdependence between countries.
Cooperation between major powers has been
increasing, but competition among them
has been more complicated. Since the 9/11
events, the US has regarded the war against
terrorism as the highest priority on its
agenda. In order to realize the goal of anti-
terrorism, it has to strengthen cooperation
with other powers, including China, and
hopes to have stable Sino-US relations.
8.3 A new concept of security
At present there is competition between the
new security concepts and the Cold War
mentality. On the one hand, some new secu-
rity concepts including cooperative security,
coordinated security, and common security
have been put forward. On the other hand,
the Cold War mentality of "zero sum
games" theory, balance of power, geopoli-
tics, still exists. In many countries there is a
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the struggle between new security concepts
and the Cold War mentality. If countries,
especially major powers, can see the world
through new security concepts and cooper-
ate to deal with non-traditional security
threats such as terrorism they can have a
win-win or a win-win-win situation be-
tween them. Otherwise, they will all lose.
In order to effectively counter terrorism,
countries should abandon the Cold War
mentality and adopt some new concepts
about global security. This would include the
concept of "mutual security". During the
Cold War, the concept of "zero sum game"
had played a crucial role in international
politics. After the end of the Cold War,
countries should accept the concept of "mu-
tual security" because of the changed situa-
tion. We should oppose any country which
builds its own absolute security upon the in-
security of others. According to the concept,
nuclear powers, especially two nuclear su-
perpowers, should speed up their process
of nuclear disarmament.
The new concept of security would also in-
clude the concept of cooperation. At present,
all countries are facing many common
problems or transnational problems, such as
terrorism, environmental problems, green-
house effect, drug trafficking, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and so on.
They should make common efforts and co-
operate to deal with the challenges. Espe-
cially, they should pay more attention to
nuclear non-proliferation, because nuclear
proliferation is still hanging like the sword
of Damocles above mankind and has never
ceased to threaten the survival of humanity.
The emphasis should be changed from em-
phasis on military security to emphasis on
comprehensive security. Although after the
end of the Cold War, geopolitical, military
security and ideological factors still play an
important role that cannot be ignored, eco-
nomic factors are becoming far more rele-
vant in international politics. So all coun-
tries should make the greatest effort to seek
settlement of differences and disputes among
nations through peaceful means.
9. A possible alliance of the United
States, Japan, Australia and India
A number of security specialists have con-
cluded that the United States, Japan, Austra-
lia and India are well on their way to form-
ing a military alliance, the heart of which
represents a NATO-styled organization in
Asia. Evidence to this effect can be induced
from the naval wargames recently held in the
Bay of Bengal. The atmospherics originating
from the leadership of the said countries also
suggest a new alliance of sorts. US Vice-
President Richard B. Cheney on a recent
visit to Japan contended that the United
States, Japan and Australia should establish
trilateral defense relations. Former Japanese
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo put forward a
proposal that the United States, Japan,
Australia and India should form an alliance
based on "common values". In May 2007 the
foreign ministers of the four countries held a
meeting in Manila and decided to proceed
with the decision to stage the Malabar series
of naval exercises., The United States, Japan
and Australia held their first strategic dia-
logue in Sydney on 8 September 2007, right
in the middle of the same exercises.
These more recent developments have coin-
cided with a rise in regionalization trends in
East Asia over the last decade or so. This ex-
pansion has lead to more economic and secu-
rity-related interdependence between coun-
tries in the region, underpinning the pillars of
regional security and stability. With this re-
gionalism, the scope of security has been
enlarged to encompass not only military is-
sues, but also those related to politics, eco-
nomics, finance, science and technology,
culture, and so on.
The common interests of countries in the
region have greatly increased, and interde-
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pendence best defines the many relationships
between them. Military means present less of
an option in East Asia and are no longer suf-
ficient to deal with the variety of security
challenges that are envisioned over the hori-
zon. Such a state of affairs will necessitate
the development of new means and concepts
to maintain stability and peace. These new
developments require a move away from the
traditional concepts of national security to
a more comprehensive and cooperative ap-
proach.
During recent years, regional institutions of
economic and security cooperation and dia-
logue have made significant progress in East
Asia. These include the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN
Plus Three (ASEAN+3), the East Asian
Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus One
(ASEAN+1), the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC), the six-party talks on North
Korean nuclear issues, and so on. These re-
gional institutions are playing an increas-
ingly important role in the economic and
security fields in Asia. However, the amount
of traction a potential multilateral alliance
based on "common values" or a concert of
democracies in Asia is likely to have is lim-
ited, and likely to have a very negative im-
pact on regional security.
Firstly, such an alliance would inevitably
divide the region. Since the end of the Cold
War, the trend of regional economic inte-
gration has grown rapidly and represents a
highly successful means by which to main-
tain regional stability. Although the United
Nations system that grew out of the Second
World War should be reformed, the current
international system based on sovereign
states remains a fundamental pillar that
should not be overridden by military alli-
ances that presuppose a superiority of sorts.
If a concert of democracy is established, the
world as well as the East Asian region will
be split two ways, with conflict dominating
the landscape instead of cooperation. Inter-
national terrorist organizations such as Al-
Qaida will likely relish such an eventuality.
Secondly, the development of a "gang of
democracies" will reek of discrimination,
especially when juxtaposed against many
developing countries. This will inevitably
undermine the concept of sovereignty, at
least according to the principles of the UN
Charter. It will produce more failed or failing
states, which will become hothouses for ter-
rorists.
Thirdly, the development of any democratic
axis will slow down the process of moderni-
zation and democracy within developing
countries. With many developing countries
suffering from the pains associated with de-
mocratization, it is likely to take a considera-
bly long time before such countries develop
their own systems of democracy that reso-
nate according to their own situation.
Regardless of the implications of this alli-
ance of democracies, the Malabar 2007 na-
val exercises have sent a message to China.
The area where the naval exercises were
held is of strategic importance for China,
representing the critical sea lanes through
which half of its imported oil transits. In
addition, some Chinese security analysts are
concerned that the four countries, namely
the United States, India, Japan and Austra-
lia, have indeed formed a multilateral alli-
ance that ultimately works to restrict China.
In June 2007, China had issued a démarche
to India, the US, Japan and Australia in
which it sought details about their four-
nation meeting, termed a Quadrilateral
Initiative. India and Australia moved to
quickly assure Beijing that security and de-
fense issues did not form part of that meet-
ing's agenda. On 23 August 2007, slightly
over a week before the Malabar 2007 naval
exercises, Admiral Timothy J. Keating,
Commander of the US Pacific Command,
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declared that the exercises were conducted
not to isolate China or to push it into a cor-
ner. He reiterated that he was interested in
engaging China and would seek to avoid
any misunderstanding. Most Chinese would
like to believe what the Admiral said. How-
ever, the US should understand that the
proof of the pudding has not been made ap-
parent to China. In recent years, China has
held that traditional concepts of security
were outmoded and that new concepts were
necessary. Thus China advocated the "New
Security Concepts" which regard mutual
trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordi-
nation as its raison d'état.
The "New Security Concepts" should be-
come the theoretic foundation for establish-
ing the regional security architecture in the
21st century. China would like to accelerate
mutual trust through dialogue and to spur
common security initiatives through coop-
eration with the US and other countries.
China understands that the only way to en-
sure the integrity of its sea lanes in the Indian
Ocean and the Straits of Malacca is to coop-
erate with the US and other countries – the
purpose of which is to build a harmonious
and stable Asia-Pacific region which is based
on mutual trust and benefit for the common
interests of all countries in the region.
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